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ARTICLES
THE "ABUSE EXCUSE" IN CAPITAL SENTENCING TRIALS: IS




During the sentencing phase of a capital trial, it is defense counsel's obligation
to humanize their client:1 to have the jurors see not merely a murderer, but a person
in whom we see the "diverse frailties of humankind, ' '2 which we recognize in
ourselves. Counsel, with the aid of a forensic psychologist or social worker,
investigate their client's past, often finding evidence that he suffered extraordinary
and continual abuse-even murderous behavior directed towards him from his
parents-during his formative years.' Craig Haney, who has compiled the social
histories of many capital defendants, provides disturbing examples:
[One] defendant was beaten nearly every day of his young life with a switch
from a tree or with a belt, was regularly locked in his room, where his parents
had removed the handles from the door and installed several locks on the
outside of the door and boarded up all the windows. They would leave him in
there for days at a time, forcing him to urinate and defecate on the bedroom
* Paul Litton, J.D., Ph.D. (Philosophy), University of Pennsylvania; Bioethics Fellow, National Institutes of
Health, Bethesda, Maryland; former death penalty law clerk to Chief Justice Deborah T. Poritz, Supreme Court of
New Jersey.
I owe special thanks to Rahul Kumar, Susan Sauv6 Meyer, Stephen Morse, and Michael Moore for numerous
discussions about responsibility and punishment theory that led to the views developed in this Article. I am
grateful to Baher Azmy, John Barton, Frank Lovett, Adrienne Martin, Frank Miller, and Mary Sigler, and Andy
Weiner for very helpful comments on previous drafts. I give my deepest thanks to Leanne Reese, my wife, who
provided extraordinary moral support.
The opinions expressed in this Article are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy of the
National Institutes of Health, the Public Health Service, or the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.
I. Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 103 (3d Cir. 2002) ("The purpose of investigation [for the penalty
phase] is to find witnesses to help humanize the defendant, given that a jury has found him guilty of a capital
offense.").
2. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion).
3. See generally Marilyn Feldman et al., Filicidal Abuse in the Histories of 15 Condemned Murderers, 14
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 345 (1986) (finding that eight of fifteen death row inmates in study were the
targets of their parents' murderous behavior); see also Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Intrinsic and Environmental
Characteristics of Juvenile Murderers, 27 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 582, 586-87 (1988)
(empirical study finding that juvenile murderers, when compared to nonviolent delinquents, "tend to come from
more violent. abusive families").
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floor, something for which he would then be punished. He cried and begged to
be let out and would become so claustrophobic that he almost asphyxiated
several times from the panic attacks that he experienced. The punishment only
escalated. As he got older his parents made him do push ups while they held a
hunting knife under his chest, as motivation to keep him from faltering.4
Penalty-phase jurors often find this kind of evidence to be mitigating, as a
consideration in favor of life imprisonment over death.
The purpose of this Article is to articulate the reasons, if any, that evidence of
suffering childhood abuse is relevant to a capital defendant's just punishment. The
Supreme Court requires state capital schemes to allow a defendant to present
evidence of his "character and record... and the circumstances of [his] offense" 5
precisely because that evidence "is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned
determination ' 6 on punishment. A capital sentencing verdict must not reflect mere
sentiment or caprice, but rather a "reasoned moral response."7 If some jurors are
affected by such evidence, but it is irrelevant to a reasoned determination, then
there will be some defendants who receive death and others who receive life
without the constitutionally required meaningful, reasoned basis to distinguish
them.8
Haney exposes one reason for penalty-phase jurors to hear evidence about a
defendant's childhood and other life experiences: the idea of a murderer for many
people, created by the media, is that of a non-human, pure demonic agent, with "no
personal history, no human relationships, and no social context." 9 Evidence of
someone's formative circumstances at least reminds jurors that resting in their
hands is the life of a person, a real human being. To eliminate from sight the social
histories of these defendants would help us only to ignore the societal seeds of
violence, which we tolerate to an inexcusable degree, and make the decision to
execute all too easy.' 0
Having jurors hear this evidence is worthwhile if it has the psychological affect
of increasing their sense of the gravity of their decision; but that rationale for
allowing such evidence does not answer either the theoretical or practical ques-
tions at hand. We need a normative account of how penalty-phase jurors should
4. Craig Haney, The Social Context of Capital Murder. Social Histories and the Logic of Mitigation, 35 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 547, 572 (1995).
5. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
6. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (emphasis
added).
7. Smith v. Texas, 125 S. Ct. 400,406 (2004) (citing Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796 (2001)).
8. Cf Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 359 (1993) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972)
(White, J., concurring)).
9. Haney, supra note 4, at 550.
10. See id. at 558 ("If violent crime is the product of monstrous offenders, then our only responsibility is to find
and eliminate them. On the other hand, social histories-because they connect individual violent behavior to the
violence of social conditions-implicate us all in the crime problem.").
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consider evidence of abuse as a morally relevant, mitigating circumstance.
Moreover, we need a rationale that is consistent with our moral and legal practices
of holding persons responsible.
Why question whether such evidence is morally relevant to a defendant's
responsibility and just punishment? On first look, it seems obvious why it is
relevant: children who are severely abused and neglected are more likely to
commit violent crimes as adults than others."' In short, severe abuse and neglect
cause criminal behavior. But James Q. Wilson argues that the law undermines the
value of self-control by allowing jurors to consider an "abuse excuse" as a causal
explanation of crime. 12 Admitting evidence to explain the cause of a crime is
troubling because causal explanations are more relevant to social science than to
making a moral judgment about a particular act. We normally express moral
judgments, resentment, and indignation towards an agent when perceiving a
wrong, without exploring all its possible psychological or social causes. Why,
then, should causal explanations matter when determining the morally appropriate
response to a capital defendant's murder?
Relatedly, the "victim of severe childhood deprivation" is a frequent character in
the legal and philosophical literature on responsibility and punishment.13 A central
11. See Kenneth A. Dodge et al., Mechanisms in the Cycle of Violence, 250 SCIENCE 1678, 1681 (1990) (finding
that physical abuse increases likelihood of later aggressive behavior even when other factors, such as poverty,
family violence, and biological factors, are known); Allan.V. Horwitz et al., The Impact of Childhood Abuse and
Neglect on Adult Mental Health: A Prospective Study, 42 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAVIOR 184, 189 (2001) (finding
that men who were abused and neglected are more likely to have anti-social personality disorder, and women who
were abused and neglected reported more symptoms of anti-social personality disorder); Barbara.K. Luntz and
Cathy S. Widom, Antisocial Personality Disorder in Abused and Neglected Children Grown Up, 151 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 670, 672 (1994) (concluding that childhood abuse is a "significant predictor" of antisocial personality
disorder): B. Rivera and Cathy S. Wisdom, Childhood Victimization and Violent Offending, 5 VIOLENCE &
VICTIMS 19 (1990) (reporting that childhood abuse increased risk of violent offending); Cathy S. Widom, Child
Abuse, Neglect, and Adult Behavior, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 355, 364 (1989) (empirical study concluding
that abused and neglected persons are more likely to be arrested for violent offenses).
12. JAMES Q. WILSON, MORAL JUDGMENT: DOES THE ABUSE EXCUSE THREATEN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM? 22-43
(1997). While Wilson discusses other kinds of "abuse excuses," the only one under discussion regards the
submission of evidence, during a capital sentencing phase, of severe physical, mental, and sexual abuse suffered
by a defendant during childhood. As Michael Stocker helpfully points out. "[t]here are many different abuse
excuses, many different circumstances in which they are deployed, and many different sorts of concerns
motivating their use." Michael Stocker, Responsibility and the Abuse Excuse, in RESPONSIBILITY 175 (Ellen
Frankel Paul et al. eds., 1999). Penalty-phase evidence of childhood abuse differs from other kinds of so-called
abuse excuses because it is not offered to show insanity or a less culpable mens rea. Defense attorneys stress that it
is relevant only to punishment, not responsibility. We should try to understand whether and how that claim could
be true. Because analyses of abuse excuses often lump them together and ignore the different purposes for which
they are offered, Stocker argues that "almost everything still remains to be done" on assessing the justifiability of
particular abuse excuses. Id. at 200. This Article takes up his invitation to contribute clarity to the "abuse excuse"
literature by analyzing one so-called abuse excuse, presented in one context, for one particular purpose.
13. See MARTHA KLEIN, DETERMINISM, BLAMEWORTHINESS, AND DEPRIVATION 1-6 (1990); JOHN MARTIN
FISCHER & MARK RAVIZZA, RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL 189, 195 (1998); R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 231-33 (1994); SUSAN WOLF, FREEDOM WITHIN REASON 37, 44, 75-76 (1990); Peter
Arenella, Demystifying the Abuse Excuse: Is There One? 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 703, 705 (1996) [hereinafter
Arenella, Demystifying the Abuse Excuse]; Phyllis Crocker, Child Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for the
2005] 1029
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question of responsibility theory is whether our practices of holding each other
responsible are compatible with determinism-the view that all events, including
human choices and actions, are causally necessitated by previous events and the
physical laws of nature. 14 Compatibilists-theorists who defend the compatibility
of determinism and responsibility-emphasize that, within our practices, we do
not excuse people just because there is a causal story behind their actions; thus, we
have no reason to think that determinism would provide an excuse for every
human choice or action. 
15
P.E Strawson makes the point in the following terms: Within our interpersonal
relationships, we are prone to a wide range of reactive emotions, such as
resentment, indignation, and gratitude.' 6 Implicit in the experience of these
emotions is the belief that the persons with whom we have interpersonal relation-
ships are responsible for their actions. When we suspend these reactive emotions
towards an agent (and thereby view her as non-responsible), it is never because we
think her actions were causally determined, but rather because of the presence of
excuses such as "he didn't mean to," "he didn't know," or "he's only a child."'
7
Our reactive emotions regarding the adult who suffered severe childhood abuse
threaten this philosophical defense of responsibility. Even if the resentment and
Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1143, 1154-1155 (1999) [hereinafter Crocker, Child Abuse and Adult Murder];
Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain from Heaven ": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989,
1025 (1996); Haney, supra note 4, at 547; Michael McKenna, The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address, 2
J. ETHICS 123, 131 (1998); Gary Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian
Theme, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS 256, 268-270 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed. 1987)
[hereinafter Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil].
For discussion of the relevance of a "rotten social background," see David L. Bazelon, The Morality of
Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 385 (1976); Richard Delgado, "Rotten Social Background:" Should the
Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQ. 9, 12-23 (1985);
Stephen J. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, in FROM SOCIAL JUSTICE TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE: POVERTY AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 114-60 (William C. Heffernan and John Kleinig, ed., 2000) [hereinafter
Morse, Deprivation and Desert]; Stephen 1. Morse, The Twilight of Welfare Criminology: A Reply to Judge
Bazelon, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 1247, 1267 (1976).
14. 1 refer to and discuss determinism as the metaphysical/scientific thesis that is traditionally thought to
threaten responsibility. Determinism is the view that the physical laws of nature completely determine what the
state of world will be at a certain time, given the existence of a previous state of the world. However, we may see
responsibility threatened by a weaker claim, which TM. Scanlon calls the "Causal Thesis." Scanlon writes, "This
is the thesis that all of our actions have antecedent causes to which they are linked by causal laws of the kind that
govern other events in the universe, whether these laws are deterministic or merely probabilistic." T.M. SCANLON,
WHAT WE OWE To EACH OTHER 250 (1998) [hereinafter SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE To EACH OTHER]. Wherever I
discuss determinism, my remarks also apply to the compatibility of the Causal Thesis and responsibility.
15. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and the Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28-53
(1968); Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1985), reprinted in MICHAEL S.
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 481-547 (1997); Stephen I. Morse, Excusing and the New
Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329 (1998); WALLACE, supra note 13, at
118-94; SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE To EACH OTHER, supra note 14, at 277-81.
16. Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in xlviii PROCEEDINGS OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY 1-25 (1962),
reprinted in FREE WILL 59-80 (Gary Watson ed., 1982).
17. Id. at 64-65.
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indignation we feel towards a capital defendant are not suspended entirely upon
learning that he suffered relentless childhood abuse, they are altered, if not reduced
in intensity. Why does knowledge of a defendant's miserable childhood alter our
reactive emotions towards him? To what implicit belief are our emotions respond-
ing? Perhaps they are responding to the belief that a defendant is less responsible,
to some degree, if her criminal disposition were causally determined by abuse
suffered as a child. If true, that explanation threatens the compatibilist defense of
responsibility. The compatibilist's reliance on our practices of holding each other
responsible is undermined if our judgments of responsibility are not as immune to
causal explanations (and therefore determinism) as compatibilists, like Strawson,
believe.
Beyond this philosophical issue, the present inquiry is important for its practical
implications because of the way judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys talk
about this kind of penalty-phase evidence. In summations like the following,
prosecutors ask capital jurors to give little weight to childhood abuse because it
demonstrates no excuse:
What it really comes down to is requiring [defendant] to accept personal
responsibility, personal responsibility for his acts. [Defendant] is personally
responsible for the ultimate act, the killing of the innocent [victim]. That's the
ultimate act and he should be required to accept the ultimate responsibility for
that act and that's the death penalty. 18
The defense attorney's response in this case was also typical: "[t]his is not about
the acceptance of responsibility. . . . [The State is] making it appear like the
presentation of mitigating factors is a denial of responsibility, where, in fact, it is a
legal right."' 9 The defense counsel is correct in saying that his client has a legal
right to present evidence of his childhood; but that is beside the point. In asking the
jury not to give weight to the defendant's proffer, including evidence of childhood
abuse, the prosecutor is raising doubt about the evidence's moral relevance to the
jury's decision. The prosecutor's remark provokes the question: If evidence
regarding the defendant's childhood is not meant to show an excuse, which
reduces the defendant's responsibility for his crime, why should the jurors regard
the evidence as mitigating?
The trial court attempted to bring some clarity in its instructions, urging jurors
"to remember that evidence of the presence of mitigating factors is not offered to
justify or excuse the defendant's conduct. Rather, it is intended to present
extenuating facts about the defendant's life or character or the circumstances
surrounding the murder that would justify a sentence less than death.",20 The state's
high court echoed that description of mitigating evidence, holding that it was
18. State v. Feaster, 716A.2d 395, 437 (N.J. 1998).
19. Id.
20. id. at 438 (emphasis added).
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improper for the prosecutor to characterize mitigating evidence as an "excuse.'
In fact, it is quite typical for courts to define mitigating circumstances as
"extenuating" or as making the defendant "less deserving" of death, while not
providing an excuse or justification.22
The question, though, is why would a defendant's childhood experiences make
him less deserving of death. Is the rationale made clear by stating that mitigating
factors are not offered to excuse or justify, but rather to show extenuating
circumstances? No. "Extenuate" means "[tlo lessen or attempt to lessen the
magnitude or seriousness of, especially by providing partial excuses."'23 Prince-
ton's lexical database, WordNet, even equates "extenuating" with "partially
excusing or justifying. 2 4 The idea that suffering severe childhood abuse is an
"extenuating" circumstance, but not an excuse, is unhelpful.
The ABA's Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Case state that a "mitigation presentation [is often]
offered not to justify or excuse the crime 'but to help explain it.' 25 But when
defense attorneys argue that evidence of childhood abuse aims to explain, but not
excuse the defendant's crime, jurors are left to their own devices to discern the
difference between an excuse and an explanation, and whether it has any moral
significance.
Thus, this Article's philosophical inquiry has practical implications. If there is a
convincing theoretical rationale for considering abuse evidence at a capital penalty
phase, then that rationale should contribute to formulating jury instructions and
provide an illuminating vocabulary for prosecutors and defense attorneys when
arguing about the relevance of the severe abuse a defendant suffered as a child.
Because of the Article's practical relevance, and to avoid distraction by the
issue's inflammatory context, the arguments herein assume that the death penalty
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., People v. Young, 34 Cal. 4th 1149, 1221 (Cal. 2005); (Branch v. State, 882 So. 2d 36, 72 (Miss.
2004); State v. Prevatte, 570 S.E.2d 440, 491 (N.C. 2002); State v. Group, 781 N.E.2d 980, 1001 (Ohio 2002);
Olsen v. State, 67 P3d 536, 588 (Wyo. 2003). See also Black's Law Dictionary 7th ed. 236 (1999) (defining a
"mitigating circumstance" as a "fact or situation that does not justify or excuse a wrongful act or offense, but that
reduces the degree of culpability and thus may reduce.., punishment").
23. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 628 (4th ed. 2000), available at http://
dictionary.reference.con/search?q =extenuating (defining "extenuate") (last visited May 28, 2005); see also
Merriam-Webster On-Line Dictionary, at http://www.m-w.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=
Extenuating (providing the following definition of "extenuate:" "a: to make light of; b: to lessen or to try to lessen
the seriousness or extent of by making partial excuses") (last visited May 28, 2005).
24. Cognitive Science Laboratory, Princeton University, WordNet 2.0, Overview for "extenuating," at
http://wordnet.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/webwn2.0?stage = I &word= extenuating (last visited May 28, 2005).
25. American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 1060 (2003) [hereinafter ABA] (quoting Haney, supra note 4 at 560
(emphasis added)); see also Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of Culpability and Death worthiness: Differentiating
Between Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 21, 54 (1997) [hereinafter Crocker,
Concepts] ("Background evidence about the defendant may also serve to explain who he is in a way that mitigates
his punishment.").
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is a justified form of criminal punishment. Furthermore, I assume that jurors
should not consider abuse evidence as aggravating even if empirically it suggests
that the defendant will remain dangerous in the future, and that they should not be
concerned with the deterrent effect of their verdict's message to society. Rather, I
take the jury's role as determining an appropriate or deserved punishment for the
offender without engaging in consequentialist reasoning, and thus, my focus is on
whether evidence of suffering severe childhood abuse supports a mitigating
consideration.
Herein, I argue that suffering childhood abuse does not render a defendant less
than fully responsible for his crime merely because it may be a cause of his
criminal act. Insofar as the Supreme Court has endorsed suffering childhood abuse
as a partial excuse where a defendant's crime is causally "attributable" to his
childhood, the Court is mistaken. Causation per se does not excuse or diminish
responsibility to any degree. If it did, a capital defendant could not offer childhood
evidence as mitigating because it would provide no meaningful basis on which to
distinguish himself from any other capital defendant (or person, for that matter).
Rather, there are two ways in which childhood abuse may be relevant in
mitigation: the first is related to the defendant's responsibility, the other is based on
considerations relevant to punishment but not responsibility. The first way recog-
nizes that rational self-control, and not the absence of causation, is the criterion of
responsibility. Abuse is relevant if it diminished the individual's capacity for
rational self-control to a degree lower than the requisite for being considered fully
responsible for one's actions. The evidence would be relevant only if it would
support the defendant's claim about his capacity for rational self-control.
However, a second rationale is needed because there are cases for which jurors
should be able to consider abuse evidence even though there is good reason to
consider the offender fully responsible. As I argue, the degree of rational self-
control required for full responsibility for committing murder is not high. More-
over, because there is a deep connection between respecting someone as a person
and considering him fully responsible for his actions, we have moral reason to be
cautious about explaining all our intuitions about victims of severe abuse by
reference to a belief that they are less than fully responsible for their crimes. I offer
an account of why suffering severe abuse is relevant to the punishment determina-
tion, even if the defendant should be considered fully responsible. Specifically, my
view rests on distinguishing the capacities needed for full responsibility from
certain safeguards that provide a fair opportunity for persons to avoid incurring
criminal punishment and, as such, help justify the burdens of the criminal law. I
argue that a minimally decent moral education serves as an important safeguard
against incurring punishment, and, thus, it is more difficult to justify the harshest
criminal sentence for a defendant whose childhood abuse interfered with a
minimally decent moral education in comparison to others who were provided that
safeguard.
In the next section, I recount the case of Robert Alton Harris, which will serve
10332005]
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the discussion throughout this article. Section III frames the article's inquiry by
summarizing the relevant Sixth and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court, including its view of why childhood abuse evidence is relevant to
the sentencing jury's determination. I argue in Section IV that suffering childhood
abuse, as a cause of adult behavior, does not diminish responsibility; rather, it is
relevant to responsibility, and only indirectly, if it diminished a defendant's
capacity for rational self-control to a level insufficient for full responsibility. I also
argue that in determining the extent to which an agent is morally responsible for
conduct, we must distinguish between a diminished capacity to conform to moral
and legal requirements, and understandably lacking the motivation to do so. In
Section V, I cite moral considerations, based on the connection between respect
and responsibility, to be cautious in interpreting our intuition that abuse evidence is
mitigating in a particular case as responding to a belief that the defendant is less
than fully responsible. In Section VI, I argue that suffering childhood abuse may be
a relevant punishment consideration, if it interferes with a minimally decent moral
education, even if the defendant should be considered fully responsible for his
crime. Section VII presents and responds to some objections, and I conclude with
practical recommendations in Section VIII.
II. CASE STUDY: ROBERT ALTON HARRIS
Before proceeding to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and the theoretical
analysis, it will be helpful to recall the story of Robert Alton Harris, victim of an
excruciatingly painful childhood and subsequent vicious murderer. I quote an
article on Harris at length because a full picture of his case, with its many details, is
necessary for thinking about issues arising herein.
On the South tier of Death Row, in a section called "Peckerwood Flats" where
the white inmates are housed, there will be a small celebration the day Robert
Alton Harris dies.
"The guy's a misery, a total scumbag; we're going to party when he goes,"
said Richard (Chic) Mroczko, who lived in the cell next to Harris on San
Quentin Prison's Death Row for more than a year. "He doesn't care about life,
he doesn't care about others, he doesn't care about himself.
"We're not a bunch of Boy Scouts around here, and you might think we're
pretty cold-blooded about the whole thing. But then, you just don't know the
dude."
State Deputy Atty. Gen. Michael D. Wellington asked the court during an
appeal hearing for Harris, "If this isn't the kind of defendant that justifies the
death penalty, is there ever going to be one?"
What crime did Robert Harris commit to be considered the archetypal
candidate for the death penalty? And what kind of man provokes such enmity
that even those on Death Row... call for his execution?
1034 [Vol. 42:1027
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On July 5, 1978, John Mayeski and Michael Baker had just driven through
[a] fast food restaurant and were sitting in the parking lot eating lunch.
Mayeski and Baker ... lived on the same street and were best friends. They
were on their way to a nearby lake for a day of fishing.
At the other end of the parking lot, Robert Harris, 25, and his brother,
Daniel, 18, were trying to hotwire a [car] when they spotted the two boys. The
Harris brothers were planning to rob a bank that afternoon and did not want to
use their own car. When Robert Harris could not start the car, he pointed to the
[car] where the 16-year-olds were eating and said to Daniel, "We'll take this
one."
He pointed a... Luger at Mayeski, crawled into the back seat, and told him
to drive east....
Daniel Harris followed in the Harrises' car. When they reached a canyon
area ... Robert Harris told the youths he was going to use their car in a bank
robbery and assured them that they would not be hurt. Robert Harris yelled to
Daniel to get the .22 caliber rifle out of the back seat of their car.
"When I caught up," Daniel said in a recent interview, Robert was telling
them about the bank robbery we were going to do. He was telling them that he
would leave them some money in the car and all, for us using it. Both of them
said that they would wait on top of this little hill until we were gone, and then
walk into town and report the car stolen. Robert Harris agreed.
"Michael turned and went through some bushes. John said, 'Good luck,' and
turned to leave."
As the two boys walked away, Harris slowly raised the Luger and shot
Mayeski in the back, Daniel said. Mayeski yelled: "Oh, God," and slumped to
the ground. Harris chased Baker down a hill into a little valley and shot him
four times.
Mayeski was still alive when Harris climbed back up the hill, Daniel said.
Harris walked over to the boy, knelt down, put the Luger to his head and fired.
"God, everything started to spin," Daniel said. "It was like slow motion. I
saw the gun, and then his head exploded like a balloon, . . . I just started
running and running.... But I heard Robert and turned around.
"He was swinging the rifle and pistol in the air and laughing. God, that laugh
made blood and bone freeze in me."
Harris drove [the] car to a friend's house where he and Daniel were staying.
Harris walked into the house, carrying the weapons and the bag [containing]
the remainder of the slain youths' lunch. Then, about 15 minutes after he had
killed the two 16-year-old boys, Harris took the food out of the bag ... and
began eating a hamburger. He offered his brother an apple turnover, and Daniel
became nauseated and ran to the bathroom.
Haris... smiled and told Daniel that it would be amusing if the two of them
were to pose as police officers and inform the parents that their sons were
killed. Then, for the first time, he turned serious. He thought that somebody
might have heard the shots and that police could be searching for the bodies.
2005] 1035
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He told Daniel that they should begin cruising the street near the bodies, and
possibly kill some police in the area.
Those familiar with the case were as mystified as they were outraged by
Harris' actions. Most found it incomprehensible that a man could be so devoid
of compassion and conscience that he could kill two youths, laugh about their
deaths and then casually eat their hamburgers.
26
It is worth taking note of our outrage to this account of Harris, the cold and
vicious murderer. Let's now turn to evidence of how he became this kind of man
and whether it affects our reaction to him.
[During an interview, Barbara Harris, one of Robert Harris' sisters] put her
palms over her eyes and said softly, "I saw every grain of sweetness, pity and
goodness in him destroyed.. . . It was a long and ugly journey before he
reached that point."
Robert Harris' 29 years ... have been dominated by incessant cruelty and
profound suffering that he has both experienced and provoked. Violence
presaged his birth, and a violent act is expected to end his life.
Harris was born Jan. 15, 1953, several hours after his mother was kicked in
the stomach. She was 6 /2 months pregnant and her husband, an insanely
jealous man, . .. came home drunk and accused her of infidelity. He claimed
that the child was not his, threw her down and kicked her. She began
hemorrhaging, and he took her to the hospital.
His father was an alcoholic who was twice convicted of sexually molesting
his daughters. He frequently beat his children . .. and often caused serious
injury. Their mother also became an alcoholic and was arrested several times,
once for bank robbery.
All of the children had monstrous childhoods. But even in the Harris
family, .. . the abuse Robert was subjected to was unusual.
Before their mother died last year, Barbara Harris said, she talked inces-
santly about Robert's early years. She felt guilty that she was never able to love
him; she felt partly responsible that he ended up on Death Row.
When Robert's father visited his wife in the hospital and saw his son for the
first time, . . . the first thing he said was "Who is the father of that bastard?"
When his mother picked him up from the hospital [after a prolonged stay due
to his premature birth] ... she said it was like taking a stranger's baby home.
The pain and permanent injury Robert's mother suffered as a result of the
birth, ... and the constant abuse she was subjected to by her husband, turned
her against her son. Money was tight, she was overworked and he was her fifth
child in just a few years. She began to blame all of her problems on Robert, and
she grew to hate the child.
26. Miles Corwin, Icy Killer's Life Steeped in Violence, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 1982, reprinted in Watson, supra
note 13, at 268-270.
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"I remember one time we were in the car and Mother was in the back seat
with Robbie in her arms. He was crying and my father threw a glass bottle at
him, but it hit my mother in the face. The glass shattered and Robbie started
screaming. I'll never forget it," she said....
"Her face was all pink, from the mixture of blood and milk. She ended up
blaming Robbie for all the hurt, all the things like that. She felt helpless and he
was someone to vent her anger on."
... Harris had a learning disability and a speech problem, but there was no
money for therapy. When he was at school he felt stupid and classmates teased
him, his sister said, and when he was at home he was abused.
"He was the most beautiful of all my mother's children; he was an angel,"
she said. "He would just break your heart. He wanted love so bad he would beg
for any kind of physical contact."
"He'd come up to my mother and just try to rub his little hands on her leg or
her arm. He just never got touched at all. She'd just push him away or kick
him. One time she bloodied his nose when he was trying to get close to her."
... All nine children are psychologically crippled as a result of their father,
she said, but most have been able to lead useful lives. But Robert was too
young, and the abuse lasted too long, she said, for him ever to have had a
chance to recover.
[At age 14] Harris was sentenced to a federal youth detention center [for car
theft]. He was one of the youngest inmates there, Barbara Harris said, and he
grew up "hard and fast."
.. Harris was raped several times, his sister said, and he slashed his wrists
twice in suicide attempts. He spent more than four years behind bars as a result
of an escape, an attempted escape, and a parole violation.
The centers were "gladiator schools," Barbara Harris said, and Harris
learned to fight and be mean. By the time he was released from federal prison
at 19, all his problems were accentuated. Everyone in the family knew that he
needed psychiatric help.
The child who had cried at the movies when Bambi's mother dies had
evolved into a man who was arrested several times for abusing animals. He
killed cats and dogs, Daniel said, and laughed while torturing them with mop
handles, darts and pellet guns. Once he stabbed a prize pig more than 1,000
times.
"The only way he could vent his feelings was to break or kill something,"
Barbara Harris said. "He took out all the frustrations of his life on animals. He
had no feeling for life, no sense of remorse. He reached the point where there
wasn't that much left of him."
... Harris' family is ambivalent about his death sentence. [Another sister
said that] if she did not know her brother's past so intimately, she would
support his execution without hesitation. Barbara has a 16-year-old son; she
often imagines the horror of the slain boys' parents.
"If anyone killed my son, I'd try my damnedest, no matter what it took, to
have my child revenged," Barbara Harris said. "I know how those parents must
suffer every day.
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"But Robbie in the gas chamber .... " She broke off in mid-sentence and
stared out a window. "Well, I still remember the little boy who used to beg for
love, for just one pat or word of kindness.... No I can't say I want my brother
to die."
... Since Harris has been on Death Row, he has made no demands of time or
money on his family. Harris has made only one request; he wants a dignified
and serene ceremony after he dies - a ceremony in marked contrast to his life.
He has asked his oldest brother to take his ashes, to drive to the Sierra, hike
to a secluded spot and scatter his remains in the trees.27
For many readers, this account of Harris' formative years alters the emotional
reaction experienced in response to the account of his murders. Gary Watson
captures well the "pause" that Harris' childhood gives to our reactive emotions:
It is too simple to say that it leads us to suspend our reactive attitudes. Our
response is too complicated and conflicted for that. What appears to happen is
that we are unable to command an overall view of his life that permits the
27. Id. at 272-74. According to an Internet account:
Both parents inflicted frequent beatings on young Robert who suffered a broken jaw at the age of
two after a punch from his father. For sport, his father would load a gun and tell the children they
had 30 minutes to hide outside the house, after which he would shoot them down like animals.
Eventually Harris senior was jailed for sexually molesting his daughters, while the mother smoked
and drank herself to death.
Clark County Indiana Prosecutor's Office, Robert Alton Harris, at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/deathUS/
harris 169.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2005).
Robert Harris was sentenced to death. When he was executed in 1992, he was the first person put to death in
California in the post-Furman era. From the California Supreme Court's opinion denying his direct appeal, it
appears that Harris' sentencer did not hear this evidence of his childhood. In summarizing the sentencing phase
presentation, the California Supreme Court mainly described the testimony that came from Robert Harris himself,
who testified at both the guilt and penalty phases:
Defendant's testimony during the penalty phase indicated he had a dismal childhood. When
defendant was approximately 11 years old, his father served two separate prison terms for having
sexual relations with defendant's sisters. The family then followed the harvest from state to state
with defendant's mother and her boyfriend. Defendant's schooling ended in the seventh grade.
Defendant's mother forced him to leave the family when he was 14, saying he was not working
hard enough. He soon stole a car and served four years in federal institutions for that crime, escape
and a separate instance of attempted escape. He was subsequently imprisoned for the voluntary
manslaughter of James Wheeler. Defendant was 26 years old at the time of trial.
Defendant admitted his testimony at the guilt phase-that he had nothing to do with killing the
boys-was a lie. Changing his story, defendant testified he had not planned to kill the boys, that his
brother had fired first, and "the next thing I knew I was shooting them myself."
Defendant claimed he was "sorry" about the murders. In support of this claim, defendant called
Deputy Sheriff Michael Mendoza who testified that when he inquired into defendant's emotional
state after he cut his wrist and reportedly attempted to stab himself with a pencil, defendant
appeared remorseful. However, defendant admitted on cross-examination he had told a jail visitor
his attorney wanted him to express remorse and he was not going to do so.
People v. Harris, 623 P.2d 240, 245-46 (Cal. 1981).
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reactive attitudes to be sustained without ambivalence... . The sympathy
toward the boy he was is at odds with outrage toward the man he is.
28
A pressing question is whether feeling "sympathy toward the boy he was" should
have any relevance to a juror deciding a criminal sentence for the "man he is." 29
The Supreme Court thinks it does, and we turn now to its jurisprudence to refine
the issue at hand and to assess the Court's justification for allowing juries to
consider evidence of this kind.
III. SUPREME COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE: FRAMING THE ISSUE
A. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Supreme Court has held that capital defendants have a right to present
evidence of their childhood and that their Sixth Amendment right to counsel
requires their attorneys to make reasonable investigations into their background,
unless it is reasonable not to. In Wiggins v. Smith, decided in June 2003, the Court
ordered federal habeas relief for a capitally-sentenced defendant because his
counsel, without reason, failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into-his social
history, including his childhood. 30 The attorneys' performance was ineffective,
falling below the professional norms for capital defense attorneys prevailing at the
time of trial. 3' The ABA Guidelines for capital defense attorneys direct them to
explore evidence of their clients' "[fWamily and social history (including physical,
sexual, or emotional abuse.., neighborhood environment, and peer influence)...
[and] cultural or religious influences. ''32 The defendant's attorneys knew "it was a
routine practice in the Maryland Public Defender's Office to retain an expert
forensic worker to prepare a social history of capital defendants and that funds
were available for that purpose."33 Counsels' performance was also unreasonable
because they had "rudimentary knowledge" of defendant's miserable childhood
28. Watson, supra note 13, at 275.
29. In denying clemency for Harris, then-California Governor Pete Wilson stated, "As great as is my
compassion for Robert Harris the child, I cannot excuse nor forgive the choice made by Robert Harris the man."
Haney, supra note 4, at 547 (quoting Decision, In the Matter of the Clemency Request of Robert Alton Harris, at 3
(Apr. 16, 1992)).
30. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534-38 (2003).
31. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (announcing a two-component test for evaluating
ineffective assistance of counsel claims). To prove ineffective assistance, a convicted defendant must show that (i)
his counsel's performance was deficient and (ii) such deficiency prejudiced his defense. Id. Regarding the
deficiency prong, "[tlhe proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms." Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
32. ABA, supra note 25, at 1022.
33. Brief of Amici Curae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. at 4, Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510 (2003) (No. 02-311) (quoting the findings of the district court), available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/
supreme_court/briefs/02-311/02-311 .mer.ami.nacdl.pdf.
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from a presentence report and a social services document, 34 which revealed that
his alcoholic mother had left him and his siblings "on at least one occasion ... for
days without food."3 5
The Court did not merely find the attorneys' performance ineffective; it held that
no reasonable judge could hold otherwise. In ordering federal habeas relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2254, the Court found that the Maryland Court of Appeal's assessment
under the federal standard of whether counsel fulfilled their duties was not merely
incorrect, but unreasonable.3 6 In the Court's view, Wiggins' defense team had an
unquestionable duty to investigate whether there was more evidence that defen-
dant suffered a horrible childhood of abuse and neglect.
The Court's reasoning is based on the empirical fact that juries are affected by
evidence of a horrific childhood. The forensic social worker hired by Wiggins'
postconviction team uncovered "powerful" evidence, which proved the prejudice
suffered by Wiggins due to his trial counsel's deficient performance: "[H]ad the
jury been confronted with this considerable mitigating evidence, there is reason-
able probability that it would have returned with a different sentence., 37 The new
evidence showed that "Wiggins experienced severe privation and abuse in the first
six years of his life while in the custody of his alcoholic, absentee mother. He
suffered physical torment, sexual molestation, and repeated rape during his
subsequent years in foster care."3 8
B. Eighth Amendment: Reasons v. Arbitrary Factors
The Court's Sixth Amendment requirement that a capital defense counsel
reasonably investigate her client's social history, unless there is reason not to, finds
its roots in the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Essentially, the Court
has held that evidence of a defendant's childhood is relevant to a reasoned
determination on punishment. We turn now to the evolution of precedent behind
that view.
In Furman v. Georgia, decided in 1972, the United States Supreme Court issued
a short per curiam opinion which overturned death sentences imposed on three
defendants, but did not explicate a basis for the decision. Each Justice wrote
separately, with five Court members voting to vacate the death sentences.39 The
opinions of Justices Stewart and White represent the holding of Furman, according
34. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524 (noting counsel's failure to investigate adequately Wiggins' past violated
established norms of the American Bar Association and the Maryland Public Defender's Office).
35. Id. at 525.
36. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003).
37. Id. at 534-36.
38. Id. at 535.
39. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Justices Brennan and Marshall argued that the death penalty,
as a form of punishment in all circumstances, violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); id. at 369 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Douglas held that the capital statutes at issue, in their
application, were discriminatory on racial and economic grounds. Id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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to the Court's subsequent jurisprudence.
The capital statutes under review were unconstitutional because they provided
no guidance for juror discretion in imposing either life or death on a defendant
convicted of a specified capital crime. The two key opinions "focused on the
infrequency and seeming randomness with which, under the discretionary state
systems, the death penalty was imposed."4 ° Justice Stewart concluded that "the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of
death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so
freakishly imposed.' Justice White held that the Eighth Amendment forbids
unguided jury discretion because it provides "no meaningful basis for distinguish-
ing the few cases in which [the death penalty was] imposed from the many cases in
which it [was] not.",42
To eliminate the problems of unguided discretion, some states responded to
Furman by eliminating discretion altogether with mandatory death penalty
schemes.4 3 However, the Supreme Court invalidated those statutes as well, holding
in Woodson v. North Carolina that they were inconsistent with "the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" and inform the
Eighth Amendment. 44 These evolving standards condemn mandatory statutes
because they "treat[] all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely
individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be
subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death."45 The joint opinion of
Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens announcing the Court's judgment, held that
"in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense."4 6
In Gregg v. Georgia, decided the same day as Woodson, the same trio of Justices
explained that "accurate sentencing information" about an offender's character
and record is constitutionally required because it "is an indispensable prerequisite
to a reasoned determination" of the appropriate punishment. 7 The Court has since
Opinions by the remaining two Justices in the majority-Justices Stewart and White-are discussed later in this
section. See id. at 306 (Stewart, J.. concurring); id. at 310 (White, J., concurring).
40. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 658 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(discussing Justice Stewart's and Justice White's opinions in Furman with respect to the Court's subsequent
jurisprudence).
41. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J.. concurring).
42. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
43. Rockwell v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 1101, 1116-18 (Cal. 1976) (Clark, J., concurring) (discussing
mandatory death schemes of California and other statutes enacted after Furman).
44. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958)) (internal quotations omitted).
45. Id. at 304.
46. Id. (internal citation omitted).
47. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S 153, 190 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (emphasis
added).
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emphasized that "the State must establish rational criteria that narrow the decision-
maker's judgment ' 48 and thus help "to ensure that the death penalty will be
imposed in a consistent, rational manner.",49 State capital statutes must allow the
administration of the death penalty "in a way that can rationally distinguish
between those individuals for whom death is an appropriate sanction and those for
whom it is not.",
50
The Court did not indicate, however, which aspects of a defendant's character,
record, and offense it is rational for a jury to consider. But two years later, in
invalidating Ohio's capital statute for limiting the defense presentation to three
statutorily prescribed mitigators, the Court held in Lockett v. Ohio that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the
rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating
factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death.5'
Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion highlighted reliability, respect, and ratio-
nality as the values underlying the Constitution's requirement that juries be
allowed to consider any aspect of a defendant's character or record proffered as the
basis for a life sentence. The heightened need for reliability in capital cases
requires such evidence because excluding it "creates the risk that the death penalty
will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty";5 2 the
respect owed to each offender implies that he must be able to show his uniqueness
as an individual; 53 and evidence of defendants' characters and records potentially
provide "meaningful distinctions" among different cases, necessary for the consis-
tent and rational use of capital punishment.54
At this point, one might wonder, in light of Woodson and Lockett, whether there
is any need to look for a reason why suffering severe abuse is truly relevant to
discerning a just punishment. After all, those opinions do not demand that there be
a mitigating rationale behind evidence proffered by a defendant seeking a life
sentence. Rather, they say that the Eighth Amendment allows jurors to hear any
evidence submitted by a capital defendant in his mitigation case. Because of this
open-ended rule, some commentators describe penalty-phase evidence as "wholly
48. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305 (1987).
49. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 960 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
50. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447,460 (1984) (emphasis added).
51. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (emphasis of "any" added).
52. Id. at 605.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 601 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976)).
55. The objection finds company in Justice Scalia's now-famous Walton concurrence, in which he argued that
there is an irresolvable tension between Furman's demand for guided discretion and Lockett's directive to allow
jurors to hear any aspect of the defendant's character, record, and circumstance of the crime that he puts forth. See
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656-661 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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unregulated, 56 with "'no substantive limitation at all."' 57 One might conclude that
a verdict must reflect a reasoned determination only if a jury chooses death; the
basis of a life sentence, in contrast, need not depend on good reason.
That reading of Woodson and Lockett would be too broad. While the threshold
for what counts as relevant mitigating evidence is low, there is, nonetheless, a
threshold, according the Supreme Court: "Relevant mitigating evidence is evi-
dence which tends logically to prove or disprove some fact or circumstance which
a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have mitigating value."' 58 For a juror
reasonably to deem some fact as having mitigating value, there must be a plausible
reason why that fact is relevant to the punishment determination. Accordingly, the
Court expressed "no quarrel with the statement ... that 'how often [the defendant]
will take a shower' is irrelevant to the sentencing determination. '59 Similarly, the
Court would not deem it error for a trial court to disallow a pro se, white
supremacist, capital defendant from submitting that his victim's status as a
non-caucasian in and of itself is mitigating. Clearly, a juror could not have a
plausible reason to find that fact, based on an invidious claim, to have mitigating
value.6 °
Relatedly, the Court held in California v. Brown that the Eighth Amendment
permits state courts to instruct capital jurors not to "be swayed by mere sentiment,
conjecture, sympathy, passion, [or] prejudice.' Presumably, mere sentiment and
feeling are not appropriate bases for a sentencing decision if the adjective "mere"
is meant to imply a divorce from reason.62 Strangely, however, the Court's
majority opinion did not rely on that observation, but rather emphasized the right
56. Garvey, supra note 13 at 1011.
57. Id. (quoting Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization
Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 YALE L. J. 835, 853 (1992) (book review)).
58. Tennard v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 2562, 2570 (2004) (emphasis added) (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494
U.S. 433,440 (1990) (internal citation omitted)).
The Court has not given a more specific definition of what "relevant" mitigating evidence is. One commentator
suggests that, perhaps, the Court "has desired to remain morally neutral on the matter of when a sentence of less
than death is deserved," and thus "has not seen fit to define in any meaningful way the proper scope of mitigating
evidence." Wayne A. Logan, When Balance and Fairness Collide: An Argument for Execution Impact Evidence in
Capital Trials, 33 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 1, 9 (1999-2000). Some commentators praise this lack of restricting
definition, arguing that it leaves for jurors to decide the difficult moral question of when death or a more lenient
sentence is deserved. Garvey, supra note 13, at 1011- 12 (citing Louis D. Bilionis, MoralAppropriateness, Capital
Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 301 (1991)). Others criticize the lack
of doctrine, characterizing the penalty phase as a "free-for-all." Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 904 F. Supp.
554, 559 (E.D. La. 1995) (describing penalty-phase evidence as "hodge-podge")).
59. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) (quoting State v. Plath, 313 S.E.2d 619, 627 (S.C. 1984)).
60. Accord Garvey, supra note 13 at 1011.
61. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 539 (1987).
62. 1 emphasize "mere" sentiment in recognizing that reason and emotion are not completely divorced from
one another. Overwhelmingly strong emotion can interfere with our rational capabilities, but emotions are not, in
general, non-cognitive. At least one difference between types of emotion is found in their different propositional
content, or rather, in the different kinds of judgments to which they are reactions. For a discussion of the
distinctive propositional content of specific moral emotions, see WALLACE, supra note 13 at 18-50.
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of state courts to "confine the jury's deliberations to considerations arising from
the evidence presented. 63 The Court's reasoning is shaky because confining
deliberations to the evidence does not rule out "merely" sympathetic responses to
it.
It is helpful to look at Justice O'Connor's Brown concurrence because it stands
on more convincing ground than the majority opinion and is incorporated into the
Court's subsequent jurisprudence. It states: "The issue ... is whether an instruc-
tion designed to satisfy the principle that capital sentencing decisions must not be
made on mere whim, but instead on clear and objective standards, violates the
principle that the sentencing body is to consider any relevant mitigating evi-
dence." 64 Her answer is that such an instruction is not unconstitutional precisely
because the "sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral
response to the defendant's background, character, and crime rather than mere
sympathy or emotion.,
65
The Court adopted Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Saffie v. Parks when
interpreting the implications of Lockett.66 The Saffle Court denied habeas relief to
a capitally-sentenced petitioner who argued that his Eighth Amendment rights
were violated when his trial court instructed penalty-phase jurors to "avoid any
influence of sympathy.",67 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, stated that
"nothing in Lockett and Eddings prevents the State from attempting to ensure
reliability and nonarbitrariness by requiring that the jury consider and give effect
to the defendant's mitigating evidence in the form of a 'reasoned moral re-
sponse.' 68 The Court reemphasized that line of reasoning in Johnson v. Texas,
stating that it has
not construed the Lockett line of cases to mean that a jury must be able to
dispense mercy on the basis of a sympathetic response to the defendant.
Indeed, [the Court has] said that "[i]t would be very difficult to reconcile a rule
allowing the fate of a defendant to turn on the vagaries of particular jurors'
emotional sensitivities with [its] longstanding recognition that, above all,
capital sentencing must be reliable, accurate, and nonarbitrary.
' 69
C. The Court's View of the Relevance of Childhood Abuse
Does a respectful, reliable and rational system allow evidence of a defendant's
suffered childhood abuse? Eddings v. Oklahoma, decided in 1982, held that a
63. Brown, 479 U.S. at 543.
64. id. at 544 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 545 (emphasis on "reasoned" added).
66. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
67. Id. at 486.
68. Id. at 493 (emphasis on "reasoned" and "response" added) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545
(1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
69. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 371-372 (1993) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 493 (1990)).
1044 [Vol. 42:1027
HeinOnline  -- 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1044 2005
THE "ABUSE EXCUSE" IN CAPITAL SENTENCING TRIALS
defendant's troubled childhood counts as a relevant aspect of a defendant's
"character or record" for a jury's sentencing determination. 70 The trial court had
stated that "in following the law," it could not consider the defendant's violent
background and family history as mitigating. 7 1 The state appellate court joined the
trial court in disregarding the evidence because it did not think it excused Eddings'
crime, although it was "useful in explaining" his act. 72 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the law does not forbid the sentencer from considering a
defendant's troubled history.73 Rather, a sentencer must be allowed to determine
the weight of that evidence.74
In 1989, in Penry v. Lynaugh,75 the Court endorsed evidence of suffering
childhood abuse as a consideration in favor of a life sentence. Penry, the defendant,
presented evidence of mental retardation and an abused childhood, but the jury
instructions, limiting juror attention to special verdict questions derived from the
Texas statute, did not explain how or whether jurors could consider it.7 6 The
defendant argued "that his mitigating evidence of mental retardation and child-
hood abuse has relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope of the special
issues, and that the jury was unable to express its 'reasoned moral response' to that
evidence in determining whether death was the appropriate punishment. 77
The Penry majority opinion, authored by Justice O'Connor, is significant
because it offers a rationale for why evidence of suffering childhood abuse is
morally relevant to punishment:
A rational juror at the penalty phase of the trial could have concluded, in light
of Penry's confession, that he deliberately killed Pamela Carpenter to escape
detection. Because Penry was mentally retarded, however, and thus less able
than a normal adult to control his impulses or to evaluate the consequences of
his conduct, and because of his history of childhood abuse, that same juror
could also conclude that Penry was less morally "culpable than defendants
who have no such excuse," but who acted "deliberately" as that term is
commonly understood.7 8
The abuse Penry suffered should be relevant to determining his culpability because
it exacerbated his mental impairments, which he had since birth. 79 But notice that
the Court separates his "history of abuse" from his diminished capacities to control
70. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982).
71. Id. at 112-13.
72. Id. at 113. But see Haney, supra note 4, at 589-602 (arguing that such evidence is mitigating precisely
because it may help explain the defendant's crime).
73. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114.
74. Id. at 114-15.
75. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
76. Penry, 492 U.S. at 302.
77. Id. at 322.
78. Id. at 322-323 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
79. Jamie Fellner provides the following summary of the abuse Penry suffered:
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his impulses or to evaluate the consequences of his actions. The Court lists that
history, along with the other considerations, as a possible "excuse" or, more
precisely, a partial excuse for someone who otherwise acted deliberately.
What is meant by labeling these considerations as an "excuse"? Regarding the
characteristics associated with mental retardation, a diminished ability to control
impulses and/or to evaluate consequences implies a diminished capacity for
responsibility; meaning, an agent who genuinely lacks the capacity to control an
impulse is not responsible for acting in accordance with that impulse when
experienced. To be considered responsible for one's actions, an individual needs to
have a certain kind of control over his conduct. To the extent that one lacks that
capacity for control, his status as a responsible agent is diminished.
Perhaps, then, suffering severe childhood abuse evidences a partial excuse in the
same way, by diminishing one's responsibility-status. But why, in the Court's view,
might a juror justifiably view a person with a deprived background as not fully
responsible? Is it because a deprived background implies a diminished ability to
control impulses? The Court had the opportunity to talk about Penry's mental
retardation and painful history as both potentially contributing to a diminished
ability to control impulses or to evaluate consequences. However, the Court did
not; those diminished abilities were associated only with mental retardation, while
a "history of childhood abuse" was listed separately. On what ground, then, does a
history of childhood abuse constitute a partial excuse, on the Court's account?
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor hints at the reason:
If the sentencer is to make an individualized assessment of the appropriateness
of the death penalty, "evidence about the defendant's background and charac-
ter is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants
who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background,
or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants
who have no such excuse."
80
The idea conveyed is that a defendant has some degree of excuse if his criminal
acts were attributable to his childhood suffering. 8 Now we might interpret that
claim in at least two ways. First, perhaps a defendant's crime is attributable to his
[His] mother beat him, broke his arms, dipped him in scalding water, burned him with cigarette
butts, and forced him to eat his own feces and drink urine. She routinely locked him in his room
without food, water, or sanitary facilities for twelve to fourteen hours at a time, then beat him when
he could not help defecating in his room. Penry dropped out of first grade. As an adult his mental
age is still comparable to the average six-and-a-half-year-old child. His IQ has been reliably
measured in the fifties and low sixties.
Jamie Fellner, Beyond Reason: Executing Persons with Mental Retardation, 28 HuM. RTS. 9, 9-10 (2001).
80. Penry, 492 U.S. at 319 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring))
(emphasis added).
81. For a judicial statement in concurrence with the Supreme Court's view, see Muhammad v. State, 46 S.W.3d
493, 498 (Tex. App. 2001) ("Mitigating circumstances relevant to punishment are circumstances which will
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childhood abuse in that the abuse was a cause of his act (i.e., such abuse
contributes to shaping the kind of person someone becomes, and thus is a cause of
that person's conduct which expressed who he is), and it is a cause over which a
defendant, as a child, had no control. It seems natural to think that a person is not
responsible for an act to the extent that it was caused by factors outside his control.
On a second possible interpretation, the Court is arguing that a criminal act is
attributable to abuse if the abuse caused deficits in the defendant's capacities that
are necessary for moral and legal responsibility. For example, if having free will or
the capacity for practical reasoning is the necessary capacity for responsibility,
then the claim would be that suffering child abuse has the potential to diminish that
capacity to some degree. In the sections to follow, I evaluate the plausibility of
these views, and whether either can capture all the ways in which jurors rationally
may consider evidence of abuse as relevant to punishment.
IV. SEVERE CHILDHOOD ABUSE: RELEVANT TO RESPONSIBILITY?
A. Childhood Abuse as a Cause of the Crime: A Partial Excuse?
The idea that suffering horrible childhood abuse reduces an agent's responsibil-
ity because the abuse is a cause of one's crime is premised on a certain theory
about the rationale behind excusing conditions. That theory holds that if an agent's
action is determined by causes outside his control, then the agent is not responsible
at all for the action. The relevant corollary would be that a person's responsibility
for an action is reduced to the extent that his action was caused by events outside
his control, such as suffering abuse.
One reason offered by Phyllis Crocker for why suffering severe childhood abuse
is mitigating is based on that causal theory of excuse. She argues that the capital
"defendant's goal is to demonstrate how he came to be the kind of person who
committed the murder, that his judgment and behavior are not entirely of his own
making, and/or that circumstances outside of his control contributed to and
affected his conduct. 82 She also calls attention to medical research suggesting that
the "the neurophysiological makeup of the brain literally may be altered as a result
of abuse and its attendant trauma., 83 On this view, childhood evidence can be
mitigating because it shows that the defendant's judgments, character, and neuro-
logical make-up were caused by forces outside his control.84
This view fails to justify the moral relevance of evidence of severe childhood
abuse. First, it is unable to distinguish between horrible and good childhoods as
causes of behavior. Aspects of a person's good childhood have causal effects on his
support a belief that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to such circumstances are less
culpable than others who have no such excuse.").
82. Crocker, ChildAbuse andAdult Murder, supra note 13, at 1155.
83. Id. at 1164 (citations omitted).
84. See also Crocker, Concepts, supra note 25, at 54.
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decisions and the formation of his character just as events in another person's
miserable childhood have on his. If an agent should be excused, fully or partially,
because some of the causes of his action can be traced to his childhood, then all of
us have an excuse available for our actions.
Indeed, the principle that a defendant's childhood is mitigating because it is a
cause of a crime undermines the very conception of mitigation in the capital
sentencing system. That system entails that (i) some people deserve capital
punishment, and (ii) mitigating evidence speaks against imposing death. Those
aspects of a capital scheme imply that within the set of defendants who qualify for
death (because, for instance, the State can prove an aggravating factor), some of
them will be able to present evidence speaking in favor of life that is unavailable to
the others. If all defendants could present the same exact mitigating factor, with the
same exact weight, that evidence would not, in fact, be mitigating because it would
not be a rational basis on which to distinguish those who may deserve death and
those who do not. Mitigating evidence is a relational concept: to say that evidence
is mitigating is to say that it presents a reason in favor of a life sentence for the
defendant presenting it, in contrast to a defendant who is identical in all moral and
legal aspects, save for that one factor. Notice, then, how childhood evidence,
presented as a cause of crime, undermines this conception of mitigation: if
childhood experiences excuse as a cause, then every capital defendant (every
person, actually) would have available those grounds for the same partial excuse.
A second problem with the proposal is that it ignores that there are infinite
causes of a criminal act that are outside an agent's control. A person's character is
formed by one's genetics and experiences of all kinds? good and bad? and his
actions express that character. The surrounding context in which someone makes a
decision to act unquestionably includes causes of the decision that are outside the
agent's control. For example, my decision to buy roasted peanuts from a street
vendor is certainly caused by inadvertently noticing the nuts' aroma. In the context
of a homicide, a defendant perceives reasons to murder because of circumstances
outside his control: perhaps someone approached him with a lucrative offer to kill
someone; he has a need for money; etc. These causes are outside the control of our
imagined defendant. If he should be partially excused for every cause contributing
to his decision or action, then we would wonder rightfully what is left of
responsibility.
One might respond by saying that the difference between suffering severe
childhood abuse and other events that are causes of criminal behavior is that we
know that there is a strong correlation between suffering abuse and adult crime. 85
However, this response fails. First, it makes one's responsibility for an action turn
on the arbitrary fact of whether we have knowledge about the other causes of one's
act; it is not our knowledge that undermines an agent's responsibility on the causal
85. For a discussion of "Partial Determinist" strategies, see MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 15 at 508-1I.
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theory of excuse, but causation. Second, we do not withhold evaluative judgments
of actions even when we do know of a strong correlation between one's action and
an event outside her control. For example, loving one's parents is initially caused
by forces outside one's control, and there surely is a causal correlation between
loving one's parents and doing nice things for them. But there is no reason to think
that our love for a parent undermines to any extent our responsibility for actions
that express that love.
Some may have the lingering intuition that an abused childhood causally
determines adult behavior to a greater degree than a good childhood. Perhaps the
argument would be that abused childhoods have greater deterministic force, which
undermines one's ability to exercise free will and avoid criminal conduct. But as
Michael Moore points out, the fact that a certain type of event makes it more
probable that an agent will engage in a certain type of conduct does "not purport to
tell us to what degree a particular action is caused."8 6 Ultimately, the idea that
childhood abuse causes criminal acts to a greater degree than other childhood
experiences cause non-criminal acts is based on an ad hoc judgment that reflects a
sense of how responsible an agent like Robert Harris is for his crimes.
The identified problems with reducing responsibility because of causal determi-
nation are really aspects of a more general underlying defect: the view assumes a
false theory of excuse. Causation per se does not undermine responsibility at all.
Certainly, there is intuitive appeal to this position. To illustrate, we excuse persons,
whom we generally hold responsible, when they are forced to act under duress. It is
natural to say that we excuse the person threatened at gunpoint for committing an
otherwise criminal act because he was caused to do so by the coercing agent.
Similarly, it seems natural to think that we do not hold the insane responsible
because their actions are attributable, or caused, by their mental disease, which is
clearly outside their control.
But as we have seen, there are many causes that do not undermine responsibility.
A convincing account of the excusing conditions in law and morality must identify
what it is about certain causes, such as the mental disease of the insane or the gun
of a coercing agent, that undermines or mitigates responsibility. And because we
do not excuse an agent merely because we can identify causes of her action, we
cannot accept the view that suffering severe childhood abuse mitigates responsibil-
ity merely because such abuse is a cause of a defendant's crime.
B. Responsibility and Practical Reasoning
Causation and responsibility are compatible because rationality is "the touch-
stone of responsibility.,8 7 That is, responsible agency does not require contra-
86. Id. at 509.
87. Stephen J. Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 251, 266 (2000) [herinafter Morse,
Rationality and Responsibility].
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causal free will, the ability to remove oneself from the causal forces of the
universe; rather, persons that we should and do consider responsible have the
capacity to reason practically: the capacity to recognize and assess reasons, and to
guide their conduct according to judgments about reasons. Regardless of whether
there are causal explanations for our actions, there is a significant moral difference
between intentional human action and other caused events: persons have the
capacity to give justifying reasons for their intentional actions. On a physical level,
it may be possible to explain human actions by citing the mechanistic workings of
the human brain as part of the physical universe, governed by the laws of physics.
But there is a distinct, and no less significant, level of explanation for human
action: we can ask a human agent for the reasons for which she acted.
The connection between responsibility and practical reasoning is implicit in our
conceptions of law and morality.88 Criminal law provides a helpful example. It
provides rules for our behavior and threatens us with varying degrees of punish-
ment for violating those rules. By doing so, the law assumes persons are capable of
taking a rule and its threat of punishment as a reason not to engage in the
proscribed form of conduct. If we generally did not have the capacity to consider
the reasons provided by law, then it would be useless. Indeed, we excuse the
insane, not because their behavior is causally determined, but because they are
irrational, incapable of recognizing and assessing reasons, and making choices in
light of their assessments. Rational self-control entails other abilities, including
"the ability to perceive accurately, to get the facts right, and to reason instrumen-
tally." 89
The idea that responsibility can come in degrees is also made intelligible by this
view. Take older children, for example. An eleven year old is responsible for his
conduct to some degree, unlike an infant, but we are uncomfortable claiming that
she should be considered fully responsible, like a normal-functioning adult. The
power of regulating one's behavior in light of reasons is not all or nothing: it can
come in degrees, and therefore can account for our considered convictions about
youth. 90
88. MOORE, PLACING BLAME, supra note 15, at 610 ("Rationality is one basic feature persons must generally
possess for our criminal doctrines to have application to them."); SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE To EACH OTHER,
supra note 14, at 280 (arguing that moral responsibility requires the capacity to "understand and assess reasons"
and to give effect to one's judgments through action because that capacity is a prerequisite to participating in
morality, understood as a "system of co-deliberation"); Morse, Rationality and Responsibility, supra note 87, at
253 (arguing that the "concept of the person as a practical reasoner" is implicit in the idea that law is meant to
guide behavior).
89. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, supra note 13, at 122.
90. See Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1195 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids
execution of offenders who committed crime under the age of eighteen because, in part, of their "lack of maturity
and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility," which "often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions; and their diminished "control, or less experience with control, over their own environment") (internal
citations omitted); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits execution of person who committed crime at fifteen years old because, in part, youth are less responsible
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Additionally, certain statutory mitigating factors make sense, given that respon-
sibility is based on the capacity to reason practically and comes in degrees. For
example, in New Jersey capital juries may consider mitigating evidence showing
that:
(a) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution[, and]
(d) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly
impaired as the result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, but not to a
degree sufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution[.] 9 1
Extreme mental or emotional disturbance can interfere with one's ability to assess
rationally one's situation and make a decision based on an assessment of the
reasons one has. In some situations, an emotional disturbance can be so great that it
undermines the requisite mens rea for a criminal charge, either reducing the degree
of one's crime or excusing the agent altogether. The New Jersey capital statute
recognizes, however, that one's mental or emotional disturbance may interfere
with rationality to a lesser degree, which would not excuse the defendant of
murder, but nonetheless reduce responsibility. Likewise, a complete incapacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of one's conduct or to control oneself in light of the
law's demands excuses because it is inconsistent with the ability to assess and
grasp reasons, make choices in light of those assessments, and to give effect to
those choices through action. But the ability to appreciate the wrongfulness or
nature of one's actions and to conform one's behavior can come in degrees, which
the statute recognizes.
C. Practical Reasoning and Childhood Abuse
Therefore, one way that suffering severe childhood abuse could be relevant to
penalty-phase deliberations would be if the defendant's capacity for rational
self-control was diminished by the maltreatment to a point below the capacity
required for full responsibility. Notice, though, in that case, the mitigating factor is
a diminished capacity for rational self-control, not the fact of abuse. Evidence of
abuse may be necessary only to support the claim that the defendant's capacity for
rational self-control was diminished at the time of the crime. This subsection
explores some ways in which severe abuse has the potential to diminish a person's
capacity for rational self-control. However, I also argue that for cases in which
suffered abuse does not diminish one's capacity for rational self-control, the
intuition remains that jurors should hear evidence of the defendant's childhood. If
than adults because they have "less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long-range terms") (internal
citations omitted).
91. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C: 11-3 (1995).
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that intuition has a rational basis, then there must be another way in which
childhood abuse could be relevant to penalty-phase deliberations.
To begin, we must understand in what way suffering severe abuse could
diminish one's capacity for rational self-control, either in general or under specific
circumstances. Crocker offers a suggestion, arguing that many persons who
suffered severe abuse have a diminished capacity for making reasoned judgments
in particular kinds of circumstances. She points out that the "lack of nurturing and
protection as a child may have so affected a defendant's psychological develop-
ment that he had an impaired ability to make proper judgments about how to
respond and act in relations to others. He may have acted out of anger without
thinking about the consequences or otherwise engaged in destructive behavior."92
Citing medical testimony, she notes that some "defendants [have been] diagnosed
as suffering from abuse-related brain damage that may have made them less able to
control their impulses to act."9 3
Crocker's arguments are plausible because they recognize that severe childhood
abuse diminishes an actor's responsibility only if, and to the extent that, the abuse
diminished one's capacity for rational control. A diminished ability to control
impulses is, arguably, a diminished ability to reflect on and evaluate the worth of
acting on an impulse before doing so. Also, extreme anger can interfere with one's
ability to reason with clarity by inordinately focusing one's attention on the object
of anger, compromising one's ability to foresee and evaluate consequences. If
suffering severe childhood abuse causes these kinds of impediments for rational
self-control, then we have found one reason why such abuse could be relevant to a
defendant's punishment, depending on its lasting effects in his psychology and the
circumstances of his crime: a "person's ability to make appropriate judgments, to
understand adequately the consequences of his actions and make logical choices,
or to control his impulses may be so impaired that in stressful, unfamiliar, or
threatening situations he will overreact and engage in impulsive and inappropriate
aggressive behavior. '94 These aspects of a diminished capacity for rationality may
reduce the responsibility of a capital defendant, whether due to severe abuse, age,
mental retardation, other cause, or combination of causes, in comparison to
defendants without such impairments.9 5
92. Crocker, Childhood Abuse andAdult Murder, supra note 13, at 1170 -1171.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1165.
95. Crocker writes:
A defendant's mental capacity to reason, reflect, and make appropriate choices and judgments is
considered in distinctly different ways at the guilt and punishment phases. At the guilt phase, a
mental impairment will affect the defendant's culpability for the murder only if he establishes such
a high level of disability that it constitutes a mental disease or defect such that he may be judged
insane or, where recognized, as possessing diminished capacity. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
has held that the death penalty is, or may be, an inappropriate punishment for certain defendants
because of their inability to make mature and reflective choices and judgments. This determination
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While Crocker does illuminate one way in which severe abuse can be relevant to
a defendant's responsibility, her argument has a significant limitation for justifying
juror consideration of childhood abuse. Her argument is relevant only to murders
committed in response to some occurrence or interaction that represents a
"stressful, unfamiliar, or threatening" situation for the perpetrator, such that his
diminished ability to control his impulses or to foresee and evaluate consequences
"may become more pronounced or debilitating, 9 6 thereby leading to murder. The
argument is inapposite to premeditated murders, for which prosecutors are more
likely to seek death. Yet many jurors consider evidence of suffering severe
childhood abuse relevant to punishment in cases of premeditated murder, where a
defendant's possibly diminished ability for rationality under stressful or threaten-
ing circumstances is irrelevant.
Take Robert Harris, for example. Our intuition is that jurors should hear
evidence of his childhood, yet his murders were not reactions to a stressful
situation that he was placed in non-culpably. After Harris carjacked them, Mayeski
and Baker agreed to wait in a desolate area while Harris and his brother committed
their planned robbery. They did not resist at all. They turned to walk away-
Mayeski wished Harris good luck-and then Harris shot his first victim in the
back. It is implausible that Harris killed his victims because he could not control
his impulses or because he was under stress, even if he were concerned that the
boys could implicate him later in the robbery. His joyous reaction after murdering
the boys evidenced his unmistakable endorsement of the reasons upon which he
acted. He did not want to control his impulses or act otherwise.9 7
We are still left without a justifying reason for the shared intuition that suffering
severe childhood abuse should be considered during a capital penalty-phase trial
when the murder at issue was premeditated or, at least, not the product of a
stress-inducing interaction or circumstance. We should assess, then, whether
Harris' childhood is relevant to punishment because it diminished his general
capacity for rational self-control (meaning, whether under stress or not, his
capacity for practical reasoning was not sufficient to consider him fully respon-
sible for any of his actions). Again, the suggestion would not be that Harris'
capacity for rational self-control is on par with the insane, deserving a full excuse,
or even below those of defendants with mental retardation, who may be held
relies not on the contention that the defendant lacks criminal responsibility but rather that he lacks
what the Court refers to as the culpability required for the death penalty. The Court has applied this
concept to young age, mental retardation, and other mental disabilities.
Crocker, Concepts, supra note 25, at 39-40 (internal footnotes omitted).
96. Crocker, Childhood Abuse andAdult Murder, supra note 13, at 1177.
97. At his post-conviction review hearing, his counsel argued that his actions were "driven by impulse, without
the mediation of that part of the brain capable of reflecting upon and weighing alternative courses of action in
appreciation of the social fabric in which action takes place." Id. at 1177 n. 137 (quoting defendant's
memorandum in support of an application for a stay of execution, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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criminally responsible but not exposed to the death penalty. 98 Admittedly, we may
not be able to make a certain assessment without helpful psychiatric or psychologi-
cal testimony about his reasoning processes. Nevertheless, assuming the account
we have of Harris and his crime are true and complete, we can begin a
determination as if we were jurors.
We can start by looking to the considerations that the Supreme Court used to
endorse the widely shared view that offenders with mental retardation are less
culpable for their crimes than unimpaired adults even though they "frequently
know the difference between right and wrong": 99
[T]hey have diminished capacities to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience, to engage
in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand the reactions of
others. There is no evidence that they are more likely to engage in criminal
conduct than others, but there is abundant evidence that they often act on
impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings
they are followers rather than leaders. Their deficiencies do not warrant an
exemption from criminal sanctions, but they do diminish their personal
culpability. I oo
These impairments do not seem to apply to Harris. The account bears no evidence
that he had trouble understanding and processing the information needed to
conform his behavior to the law. He clearly could engage in logical reasoning and
act on a premeditated plan to an adequate level: he planned to rob a bank; reasoned
that he should use someone else's car in order to reduce his chances of getting
caught; the account suggests he knew how to hotwire a car; etc. t0 1 He was not a
blind, unreflective follower: he took the lead in executing the robbery plan he
shared with his brother. ' 02 And significantly, the account suggests that he had the
ability to understand the moral and emotional reactions of others: he knew that his
victims' deaths would cause incredible pain to their parents, and that his actions
were evil. 103
Of course, these considerations need not exhaust all relevant factors related to
an agent's capacity for practical reasoning. Furthermore, the assessment thus far
does not show that some people are not better reasoners than others. The question
is whether Harris' capacity for practical reasoning was at a level that should be
98. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 317-321 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids states
from executing criminal offenders with mental retardation).
99. Id. at 318.
100. Id.
101. See Corwin, supra note 26.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 27. Harris did suggest searching for cops to kill--cops who might be searching for bodies after
hearing shots. Id. That suggestion might seem irrational; if he were worried that the sound of his gunshots
hindered his chances of escaping detection, firing more gunshots in the same area help would not help.
Nevertheless, whether or not his suggestion was irrational under the circumstances, he did not act on it. Id.
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considered mitigating, with respect to holding him responsible for violating the
criminal law against murder. Thus far, there is no reason to think that Harris'
capacity for rational self-control was diminished in a sense that justifies holding
him less than fully responsible for his act.
D. Moral Competence and Responsibility
Several moral and legal theorists, including Jay Wallace, argue that the theory of
responsibility invoked in the previous discussions is not complete: the capacity for
practical reasoning, generally, is a necessary condition of responsibility, but not
sufficient.'o In order for it to be fair to hold someone morally responsible for his
actions, on this view, he must have the capacity to grasp and be guided by distinctly
moral reasons. '0 5 The argument assumes that an agent can be a practical reasoner
without the capacity to understand and be guided by moral considerations. But like
the capacity to reason generally, the capacity to recognize and be guided by moral
reasons comes in degrees. One might argue, then, that suffering severe childhood
abuse can diminish a person's capacity to grasp and be guided by distinctly moral
reasons, and therefore, to the extent to which someone's capacity for moral
competence is diminished by his abuse, he is less than fully responsible.
In applying his theory of responsibility to the victim of severe childhood abuse,
Wallace points out that such childhood circumstances often will make it "ex-
tremely difficult to take moral requirements seriously as independent constraints
on what they do."' 1 6 He continues: "They may be subject to a kind of pent-up,
displaced anger much more insistent than the emotions most of us experience, and
this may be a source of unusually strong incentives to antisocial behavior."'
10 7
Finally, Wallace highlights that victims of severe abuse may feel unworthy of
respectful relationships and, thus, may engage in self-destructive behavior because
it "confirms their sense of failure and worthlessness."' 08 On this account, suffering
severe abuse as a child is relevant to responsibility, not as a cause, but because "it
leaves [these] continuing traces in the adult's psychological life"' 09 that impair the
agent's power to grasp and be guided by distinctly moral considerations.
Wallace's argument does not provide a reason to consider a less severe criminal
penalty for someone like Robert Harris. To see why, let us start with Wallace's
characterization of his view: "[A]ppeals to childhood deprivation affect our
104. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 154-194 (providing several possible exemptions to accountability based on a
lack of "reflective self-control" by the acting party); see also FISCHER & RAVJZZA, supra note 13, at 79-80; WOLF,
supra note 13, at 70-71, 117 (1990); Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511,
1609-10 (1992); Stephen J. Morse, Reasons, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363,
375-76 (2004).
105. See WALLACE, supra note 13, at 154-94.
106. Id. at 232.
107. Id. at 232-33.
108. Id. at 233.
109. Id.
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judgments of responsibility by altering our perception of the motives and abilities
of the wrongdoer as an adult; they make the adult wrongdoer's actions seem, not
inevitable, but psychologically intelligible."" 0 First, evidence that makes a crimi-
nal act "psychologically intelligible" does not, by itself, provide any reason to
conclude that the actor's capacity to conform to moral or legal requirements was
diminished at all. A mental health expert can make "psychologically intelligible"
any murder by exposing the subconscious, as well as conscious, forces contribut-
ing to an agent's decision. Even having very strong antisocial desires does not, by
itself, imply a diminished capacity for conforming one's behavior to moral and
legal requirements. Wallace's key claim, then, is that severe childhood abuse
"alter[s] our perception of the motives and abilities"' " of the adult criminal.
First, regarding an agent's moral abilities or capacities, Wallace argues that to
hold an agent responsible fairly, he must have a "participant understanding" of the
reasons expressed in moral principles "that goes well beyond the ability to parrot
the moral principle in situations in which it has some relevance." '" 2 Wallace
continues:
What is needed, rather, is the ability to bring the principle to bear in the full
variety of situations to which it applies, anticipating the demands it makes of
us in those situations, and knowing when its demands might require adjust-
ment in the light of the claims of other moral principles. " 3
We can see how someone like Harris would lack a participant understanding of
certain moral principles that require attunement to more nuanced moral consider-
ations. Because of his life circumstances, he may be inadequately familiar with our
general expectations regarding considerateness, gratitude, the moral norms inter-
nal to friendship, etc., in addition to lacking any motivation to fulfill them.
But is it plausible, even on Wallace's account of what it means to grasp moral
considerations, to conclude that an agent like Harris, due to the abuse he suffered,
lacks the capacity to grasp moral reasons not to murder others? Again, he
demonstrated a capacity to understand how important that principle is: he knew the
kind of pain his murder would cause his victims' parents. Furthermore, the "ability
to bring [that] principle to bear in the full variety of situations to which it applies"
does not require a significant degree of moral abilities beyond those already
entailed by the general ability to reason practically. Of course, within everyday
life, it is almost never permissible to violate the principle. There are cases in which
it is difficult to determine how that principle binds us: is euthanasia or abortion
murder? Is a battered wife jusitified in killing her sleeping abuser? But the fact that
an agent like Harris does not care whether he violates the principle does not imply
110. Id. at233 n.8.
11. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 233 n.8 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 157.
113. Id.
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that he lacks the capacity to understand that the principle would be relevant for
such topics. And finally, even if moral competency requires the ability to under-
stand some reasons behind a moral rule, it would be difficult to argue that very
basic reasons behind "do not kill people" are beyond the grasp of adults who have
the capacity to reason practically, even if severely abused as children.
It is more accurate to say that Harris had the capacity to understand and be
guided by moral considerations, but that, to a great extent, lacked the motivation to
conform to them. He exhibited no respect for the value of his victims or the rules of
society, but far from showing an incapacity to understand moral demands, his
actions showed his grasp. As Michael McKenna points out, Harris' "callous wish
to inform the parents of their losses, his willingness to kill police (those who
enforce the moral order), and the pleasure he took in shooting two young boys" are
evidence that Harris' "evil, murderous mind was precisely so because he under-
stood quite well the depth of [our moral] values."' 1 4 He recognized moral
requirements, but chose to "repudiat[e] ... the moral community' 15 that, in his
eyes, rejected him.
Also, from the evidence we have, it is plausible to conclude that Harris did
value, or at least showed some minimal respect, for the value of his siblings' lives.
His sister Barbara talked about how he expressed his rage by breaking things and
torturing animals, but she provided no evidence that he harmed family members.
Harris asked his older brother the favor of scattering his ashes after his death.
Assuming he had reason to trust his brother, they must have had at least some
mutual respect and affection if he could expect his brother to fulfill his wishes.
Presumably, Harris did feel the force of the reasons to treat his siblings in certain
ways and refrain from harming them. He had the capacity to understand those sorts
of reasons; but with regard to others, he seemed to have no moral motivation.
If Harris had the capacity to recognize and be guided by moral considerations,
does our knowledge of his history of abuse alter our perception of his motives,
making him seem less blameworthy? As Wallace suggests, we might think that a
victim of childhood abuse who commits adult acts of violence is motivated, in part,
by self-destructive forces due to his lack of self-worth, and not merely by a
malicious attitude towards his victim and others. A murder motivated, in part, by
self-hatred, and not merely by greed or malice for the victim might seem less
blameworthy than a murder motivated purely by viciousness.
However, the discovery of unconscious motivation should have no bearing on
our moral assessment of an agent's blameworthiness. In morally assessing an
agent's action, we assess the quality of her reasoning: we assess her attitudes
towards us and others that she expresses through the reasons she considers, acts
upon, and ignores. Whether someone unconsciously desired to self-destruct says
114. McKenna, supra note 13, at 131.
115. Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil, supra note 13, at 27 I.
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nothing about the attitude he expresses towards others in violating their rights.
Even if Harris subconsciously desired to self-destruct, he nonetheless expressed
that urge through a choice to murder other people." 16
Thus far, I have rejected the idea that Harris' capacity for recognizing and
applying distinctly moral reasons is diminished in a way that would reduce his
responsibility for his murders. I have argued that there is a distinction between
having the capacity to recognize and be guided by moral considerations, and
actually having the motivation to do so. In part VI, in arguing that there is reason
for jurors to consider the history of abuse that a defendant like Harris suffered, I
will return to that distinction.
V. RESPECT AND RESPONSIBILITY
Before doing so, I argue that we should be cautious about concluding that Harris
and other individuals with similar childhoods should be considered less than fully
responsible for their actions, in general. As stated, there is reason to consider them
less responsible when their abuse has caused mental or emotional problems that
interfere with their capacity for practical reasoning. But for moral reasons, we
should guard against interpreting our reactive attitudes towards Harris and similar
individuals as responding to the proposition that they are less than fully respon-
sible.
First, to deem an agent less responsible solely because of a historical fact about
his past is to make the same claim for anyone with that kind of past. That
conclusion is demeaning to people who have a similar background of suffering,
especially because the overwhelming majority do not become murderers. 1 1 7
Craig Haney makes an argument implying that it would not be demeaning to
others with similar backgrounds to think capital defendants who suffered abuse are
less responsible. He argues that there are always differences in life circumstances
between those who become violent adults and those who do not. 118 For Haney, the
thought, "not everyone at risk for criminal behavior becomes a criminal" does not
speak in favor of viewing capital defendants who were abused as fully responsible.
He argues that the "not everyone" argument ignores that there are causal explana-
tions for why one abused child winds up on death row, while another does not. Due
116. Furthermore, it would be unconvincing to argue that unconscious urges, by their influence on someone's
actions, diminished one's responsibility. We can understand an unconscious motivation as a cause of an agent's
decision, but we have no reason to interpret it as compelling an agent's choice. See Michael S. Moore,
Responsibility for Unconsciously Motivated Action, 2 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 323, 338 (1979).
117. See Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder, supra note 13, at 1158 (citing Dorothy Otnow Lewis,
From Abuse to Violence Psychophysiological Consequences of Maltreatment, 31 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD &
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 383, 388 (1992)) ("[M]ost abused children do not turn into violent criminals."); Cathy
Spatz Widom, Child Abuse, Neglect, and Adult Behavior: Research Design and Findings on Criminality,
Violence, and Child Abuse, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 355, 364 (1989) (reporting study finding that over
seventy percent of adults who were abused children had no criminal record at all).
118. See Haney, supra note 4, at 589-602.
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to some cause or another, people use varying ways of coping and struggling with
their past abuse. Therefore, along Haney's line of thought, it would not demean
non-violent survivors of abuse to consider defendants like Harris less responsible
because there are salient differences between them.
The problem with Haney's argument is that it takes causation as the basis for
undermining responsibility or, in his words, "free choice." His view approaches
too closely the sentiment of the French proverb, "tout comprendre c'est tout
pardoner"-to understand all is to forgive alll' 9-the better we become at
identifying the psychological and social causes of behavior, the more reason we
will have to reduce someone's responsibility. But, as argued, responsibility
depends on rationality, and not the absence of causation. Therefore, from the
perspective of morality and law, we do not have reason to investigate all the causal
differences leading one abused child to a non-violent life and another to death row.
It remains demeaning, then, to the former to reduce the responsibility of the latter
based on a history of abuse; to do so implies that they both lack the requisite
capacity for responsibility. The "not everybody" argument does not mean that
capital defendants should be prohibited from introducing evidence of childhood
abuse; but it does show that we should not reduce the responsibility of a capital
defendant just because he was abused. ' 20
A second moral problem with holding agents like Harris less than fully
responsible despite their capacities for reason is that from their own point of view,
it is demeaning to be grouped with older children and agents with some mental
impairment, with regard to their responsibility-status. In general, adults do not
treat older children as equals and do not think they have adequate experience to
know what is best for themselves. It is degrading to an adult to be treated like a
child in certain ways, including being viewed as less than fully responsible. This
consideration is not dispositive, of course; if someone with a diminished capacity
for practical reasoning finds it demeaning to be viewed as less than fully
responsible, we do not have moral reason to resist the conclusion that the person is
less than fully responsible. However, if there is a compelling alternative account of
our intuitions and emotional reactions to agents like Harris, these kinds of moral
considerations give us reason to resist interpreting our intuitions and reactions as
based on a judgment of diminished responsibility.
Third, deeming Harris less responsible diminishes the wrong (as opposed to the
harm) suffered by his victims. An extreme case helps illustrate the point. If a victim
is injured in an earthquake or at the hand of someone completely insane, then the
victim, while harmed, was not wronged. There is no one from whom the victim can
demand a justification or an apology. Moving along the responsibility spectrum,
119. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, supra note 15, at 1092.
120. To emphasize, abuse reduces responsibility only if it causes a diminished capacity for rational
self-control.
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imagine being victimized by an adult, as opposed to a child. The harm caused may
be the same, but we take the wrong committed by the adult as more serious,
legitimizing greater resentment and indignation because the adult, but not the
child, is fully responsible. Therefore, to the extent that a wrongdoer's responsibil-
ity is diminished because of a partial excuse, the wrong suffered by the victim is
diminished.
The wrong Harris committed against his victims does not appear, in any sense,
diminished because of Harris' childhood. This point may be seen most easily from
the perspective of the victims' parents. From their viewpoint, Harris had full
control over his actions, capable of making different choices on that day. He did
not have any reason to kill their sons. Nothing coerced him into shooting those
boys. And this view of Harris and his crimes seems plainly right. In light of these
facts, it is objectionable to justify a view about Harris' responsibility that would
imply that the wrong he committed against those boys was not as serious as the
wrong committed against other murder victims.
These considerations represent moral reasons to prefer an interpretation of our
intuitions that does not imply that agents like Harris are necessarily less than fully
responsible. In the following, I suggest a reason why evidence of childhood abuse
is relevant to determining a just punishment for an individual even if the abuse did
not cause a diminished capacity for rational self-control. That is, even if Harris was
fully responsible for his crimes, there was good reason for a penalty-phase jury to
consider his childhood as a mitigating factor.
VI. RELEVANCE TO PUNISHMENT BUT NOT RESPONSIBILITY
A. Attributive versus Substantive Responsibility
The distinction between attributive and substantive responsibility, clarified by
T.M. Scanlon, is helpful to understanding the reason for jurors to consider
evidence of childhood abuse, even if the defendant should be considered fully
responsible for his crime. An agent is responsible for an action in the attributive
sense if "it is appropriate to take [that action] as a basis of moral appraisal of that
person."' 21 It is this kind of responsibility that has been discussed primarily
throughout this Article. To illustrate, recognizing that an insane person should not
be considered responsible is to say that her acts should not be attributed to her, and
thus should not be taken as a basis for praise, blame, or other evaluative attitude.
When we criticize someone's actions, we charge her with either failing to
recognize or ignoring a reason he had to perform or avoid a certain action.
Therefore, it makes sense to consider responsible, in the attributive sense, only
agents who have the capacity to recognize and be guided by reasons.
Moreover, we may consider practical reasoners (attributively) responsible only
121. SCANLON, WHAT WE OwE To EACH OTHER, supra note 14, at 248.
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for attitudes, beliefs, choices, intentions, and other phenomena that are judgment-
sensitive. Intentions are judgment-sensitive, for example, in that it is sensible to
ask someone for her reasons for performing a particular action. It is senseless to
ask someone to justify her height or why she loves her newborn, but quite
appropriate to ask why she is going to the airport, why she stepped on your foot, or
why she did not like a certain movie.
Judgments about agents' substantive responsibility, on the other hand, express
"claims about what people are required (or ... not required) to do for each
other." 122 Our substantive responsibilities include our duties to others, such as our
duty not to murder, to care for our children, etc. But our substantive responsibility
also includes other kinds of burdens it is fair to impose on each other. For example,
it is our responsibility to bear the burden of the criminal law's threat of punishment
and to suffer the burden of actual punishment when we commit crimes.
Attributive and substantive responsibility are related to each other in the
following way: our substantive responsibility is affected, in part, by the choices we
make, for which we are responsible in the attributive sense. To illustrate, in
determining whether it is fair to impose a particular burden on an individual (what
she is substantively responsible for), one consideration is whether the person had
opportunity to avoid incurring that burden by exercising her capacity for choice
(attributing her choice and action to her). One reason it is fair to impose criminal
punishment on people who violate the criminal law is that they had an opportunity
to avoid incurring punishment by choosing different courses of action. It is unfair
to punish the insane because, as non-responsible individuals, they did not have the
opportunity to choose appropriately.
Scanlon seeks to explain this relationship, asking why it "seems that when a
person could have avoided a certain result by choosing appropriately, this fact
weakens her grounds for rejecting a principle that would make her bear the burden
of that result." 123 His answer is that persons, as a class, have good reason to want
the way in which others treat them to depend on their choices or, at least, on having
had the opportunity to choose. First, we have instrumental reasons. Generally, a
person is better able to satisfy her desires if what happens to her depends on her
choices. I more likely will receive what I want at a restaurant if the wait staff brings
me food that I choose, rather than choosing for me. 1 24 Second, many of our choices
have representational value, in that they reflect what we care about. Taking
Scanlon's example, I more likely will buy my wife something that she wants if I
ask for her preferences, but I want to choose an anniversary gift myself to "reflect
my thoughts about her and about the occasion." 1 2 5 Third, choice has symbolic
value. In circumstances in which we expect competent persons to make choices for
122. Id.
123. Id. at 256.
124. See id. at 251-52.
125. Id. at 252.
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themselves, it is demeaning not to respect a person's choice because it deems them
incompetent. 126 For example, having the right to vote not merely allows someone
to increase the odds that her preferred candidate will win; possessing the right
symbolizes one's status as an equal among others.
Because of these positive reasons to want what happens to us to depend on our
choices, we have reason to endorse moral and legal rules that distribute burdens
based on how we exercise our capacity for choice. Put differently, our grounds for
complaint against a scheme for distributing burdens are weakened if the rules give
us fair opportunity to avoid incurring them.' 27 The justifiability of criminal law
rests, in part, on the fair opportunity to avoid incurring punishment.
B. Burdens and Safeguards
However, in many circumstances, the fact that an agent chooses to perform an
act that he knows may bring great suffering upon himself will not, by itself, license
others to impose that suffering. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment recognizes that moral principle. It is immoral to impose
certain forms of punishment-such as a torturous death-on an individual even if
that person believed that by choosing to perform a certain act he was exposing
himself to the risk of suffering a torturous death. In addition to the reason to want
what happens to us to depend on our choices, other moral considerations bear on
the determination of what burdens it is fair to place on each other.
Because the criminal law exposes people to a risk of harm that is quite severe (i.e.
punishment), certain safeguards are morally necessary to justify exposing people to it.
The excusing condition of duress represents one safeguard. The conditions under which
someone makes a choice have normative significance "separate[] from the fact of choice
itself;, 12 8 and the coercive conditions under which an agent under duress makes a choice
do not provide a fair opportunity for her to avoid what looks like a criminal act.
Additionally, as other commentators have recognized, certain societal and economic
conditions provide a necessary safeguard for individuals against incurring punish-
ment.129 The state does not have the right to punish if economic and societal conditions
are such that it is clearly rational for citizens to commit crimes rather than pursue a decent
life within the law. The maintenance of certain social and economic conditions, then,
provides a safeguard against incurring punishment to the extent that those conditions
reduce the rationality of committing crime.
126. See id. at 253.
127. See SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE To EACH OTHER, supra note 14, at 263.
128. Id. at 261.
129. See, e.g., id. at 264 (stating that a necessary safeguard is "the maintenance of social and economic
conditions that reduce the incentive to commit crime by offering the possibility of a satisfactory life within the
law"); Bazelon, supra note 13, at 386-87 (contending that a truly just criminal law requires social justice); Jeffrie
Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, in PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS READER 3, 17-27 (A. John
Simmons et al. eds., 1995) (arguing that societal conditions created by capitalism call into doubt the state's right to
punish).
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C. Moral Education as a Safeguard
The existence of safeguards that create a fair opportunity for citizens to avoid
incurring punishment is necessary for the justifiability of the criminal law. Our
societal practice of socializing our children-of giving them a moral education so
that they internalize moral principles-also serves as a safeguard for individuals
against incurring punishment. Being adequately socialized allows individuals to
choose more wisely between a life of crime and a life within the law's demands.
The law deters us from committing crimes by threatening punishment, but most of
us avoid violating the criminal law without considering that threat. We have
internalized moral principles, such that we do not even consider committing
violent crimes. Even if the thought of committing a crime is contemplated, most of
us reject the idea as immoral. For times when the temptation to commit crime may
cloud someone's thinking, the law's threat of punishment adds a strong reason of
self-interest against committing a prohibited act.
Developing a respect for the rule of law is part of a moral education's function as
a safeguard against choosing crime. But imagine the understandable effects of a
childhood like Harris' on one's respect for the legal order. Not only did no one
protect Harris from his father's violence and his mother's disdain; when the state
took over his care, it failed him horribly. His sister reported that he was raped
several times when housed in federal youth detention centers, which she described
as "gladiator schools."1 30 He had to "learn[] to fight and be mean" to survive, and
simultaneously indicated that life was not worth living, slashing his wrists twice in
suicide attempts. 131 If presented with this evidence of Harris' life during a penalty
phase, a juror might infer that he expected nothing from the law and saw it as
having absolutely no value for his life. It is understandable that "[p]eople whose
sense of being wronged is not recognized and affirmed by the law have less respect
for and less investment in it.", 132 "[One important step in building respect for the
rule of law lies in ensuring that people have the right sense of what they can
demand from a legal system and that they see the legal order as valuable because it
provides these benefits."'
' 33
Harris' moral education was excessively poor. If his parents' goal was to raise a
violent criminal who would not care about respecting other people, then they used
very effective means. The kind of treatment Harris suffered inhibits the internaliza-
tion of fundamental moral principles and breeds violent tendencies. It is difficult to
fathom that he understood the benefits of participating in respectful interpersonal
relationships. It is understandable that children who are not protected and suffer
130. Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil, supra note 13. at 273.
131. Id.
132. T. M. Scanlon, "Punishment and the Rule of Law," in THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE: ESSAYS IN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 219, 223 (2003).
133. Id. at 225.
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miserably from severe abuse do not see the value of living on terms of mutual
respect with others. To the extent that someone has not been shown the value of
living kindly and morally with others, it is understandable if he does not feel the
force of the reasons to live in that way. That observation does not imply that
someone like Harris is less than fully responsible, in the attributive sense, for his
crimes. To repeat briefly, he had the capacity to assess his choices, to grasp reasons
not to commit murder and risk punishment, and, as such, his intentions and choices
expressed his judgment-sensitive, vicious attitudes about the value of his victims'
lives.
But we are now in a position to see why suffering severe and extended abuse and
neglect, insofar as it is inconsistent with a moral education, should be considered a
mitigating circumstance by penalty-phase jurors: In determining the fairness of
imposing a particular burden on an individual, it is morally relevant whether he
was deprived of an important safeguard against incurring that burden. It follows
that in determining the fairness of imposing our harshest burden under the criminal
law, we should consider the extent to which he was deprived of a moral education
because that serves as an important safeguard against incurring criminal punish-
ment. That deprivation is especially significant because other offenders, raised in
circumstances conducive to the internalization of moral principles, were provided
that protection.
Reflecting on our capital punishment system helps clarify that last point. The
death penalty is not meant for all murderers. There is an important moral
distinction between those who were afforded the safeguards against incurring
criminal punishment and those who were afforded fewer. In relation to someone
who received a moral education, it is more difficult to justify the harsher
punishment-the more severe burden--on someone who was deprived of that
safeguard against choosing a life of violence. The conclusion is not that being
deprived of a safeguard automatically rules out the justifiability of the more severe
of the two sentencing options. Rather, it is that in comparison to another defendant
who did receive the safeguard of a moral education, there is a reason speaking in
favor of the more lenient sentence for the defendant who did not.
Compare your intuitions about Harris with those in response to another
well-publicized capital defendant. Fred Neulander was convicted of murdering his
wife by hiring a hitman, who completed the job with a lead pipe.134 Clearly, like
Harris, Neulander proved capable of committing a cruel and vicious crime. But
let's stipulate that Neulander did not suffer extreme and continual abuse as a child.
At least we have reason to think that he was provided the safeguard of a moral
education. First, Neulander was a rabbi, a founder of one of New Jersey's largest
134. John Springer, Rabbi Gets Life in Prison, Still Professes Innocence in Wife's Slaying (describing the
sentencing of Rabbi Fred Neulander to life in prison for the contract killing of his wife), at http://www.courttv.coml
trials/neulander/sentencing.ctv.html (last visited May 30, 2005).
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reform synagogues.' 3 5 Presumably, he gave sermons advocating a life within
"God's law." Second, there was no evidence of childhood abuse presented at his
penalty phase.
My claim is not that death was necessarily appropriate for Neulander, but not
Harris. 136 My only claim is that a jury should consider Harris' formative years,
which were antithetical to a moral education, because he was deprived a significant
safeguard against incurring punishment that figures in the justification of criminal
punishment. Moreover, I do not claim that a penalty-phase jury should find
mitigating any and all evidence showing that the defendant suffered abuse as a
child. The jury must decide in light of the defendant's social history and possibly
other expert testimony whether and to what extent the defendant was deprived of a
minimally decent moral education (in addition to whether his capacities necessary
for attributive responsibility were diminished). For example, suffering abuse from
one parent may not provide any evidence that the defendant was deprived of a
minimally decent moral education if he received affection and consistent, nonarbi-
trary, nonpunitive discipline from his mother.1
37
D. Moral Intelligibility: Bearing the Burdens without Benefits
One might object that my account falls prey to the criticisms I offered against
the view that predicated the excuses on causation. An objector might claim that the
lack of a moral education is merely a cause of crime, which makes it more likely
that a person will wind up in the defendant's chair. Furthermore, there are many
causes that precede an individual's decisions to commit a criminal act, i.e., there
are many factors that contribute to the likelihood that a child will grow up to be an
adult who violates the law. For one, we know that being male makes it more likely
that a person will commit a crime, all other factors held constant. From the
viewpoint of social science, these causes affect someone's abstract chances of
committing a crime. So, the objector might conclude, why wouldn't the existence
of any event or fact that made it more likely for someone to commit a crime count
as the absence of a safeguard against incurring punishment? What distinguishes a
lack of moral education?
Severe abuse and its potential accompaniment of a lack of moral education are
not relevant merely because they may be a cause of a defendant's crime. It is not
merely that Harris' childhood was a psychological cause of his failure to feel the
force of reasons to respect other persons and the law. Rather, knowledge of his
135. Matt Bean, The Rabbi, His Wife, and the Hitmen (reporting on the capital murder charge against
Neulander), at http://www.courttv.com/trials/neulander/background-ctv.html (last visited May 30, 2005).
136. Other factors are relevant to discerning a just punishment. But also note that my argument in this Article is
consistent with the view that no one deserves the death penalty.
137. See Joan McCord, The Cycle of Crime and Socialization Practices, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211,
224-25 (1991) (finding that "[mlaternal affection, self-confidence, and consistently nonpunitive discipline or
supervision served as protections against criminogenic influences).
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formative years makes his rejection of those reasons morally intelligible to us. In
assessing the fairness of imposing burdens on each other, we accept the moral
principle that it is fair to place the burdens of a practice on an individual to the
extent that the agent benefits from participating in that practice. If the benefits of a
practice are possible only by imposing certain burdens on people, there is, at least,
a primafacie reason to see fairness as requiring those burdens to be placed-on the
practice's beneficiaries. To the extent that someone does not benefit from the
practice, it is more difficult to justify placing burdens of the practice on that
individual.
Being male, for example, might be a factor that makes it statistically more
probable for someone to commit a crime; but being male does not make one's
moral failures morally intelligible. Harris' motivations are not merely psychologi-
cally intelligible as a reaction to the way he was treated throughout his life; they
are, somewhat, morally intelligible as a response, based on our general view that
someone should not bear the burdens of a practice from which he does not benefit.
To be overly cautious, I emphasize that I am not saying his cruel and vicious
actions were morally justified to any degree. Rather, suffering severe abuse and
neglect is a morally relevant cause of crime because we have reason to empathize
with the individual's failure to feel the force of living on terms of mutual respect
with other persons: learning that someone suffered extremely severe and continual
abuse, was unloved, neglected, punished arbitrarily, and otherwise treated as an
object of disdain, understandably affects our view of how severely we may punish
him, in comparison to someone who was shown the value of respectful interper-
sonal relationships. We simultaneously see that an agent like Harris had the
capacity to recognize moral considerations and control his behavior, but his lack of
moral motivation is morally intelligible.
The argument presented exposes a different kind of consideration that is
relevant to punishment. Traditionally, on deontological accounts of punishment,
the guilty should be punished according to the "wrong one commits or the harm
one causes," and one's responsibility for that wrong or harm.138 At least in the
capital context, my argument implies that a third kind of consideration may be
relevant: the extent to which a defendant was deprived of a safeguard against
incurring punishment that plays a role in establishing the fairness of imposing
criminal sanctions on individuals. As argued, the fact that Harris suffered extraor-
dinary abuse and neglect does not alter the wrong he committed or his responsibil-
ity, given that he had an adequate capacity for rational self-control. But it is
relevant to the extent that it deprived him of a morally significant safeguard.
138. David 0. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: How (Not) to Punish Minors
for Major Crimes, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2004). Brink's discussion specifically references a "retributive
conception of punishment," as opposed to the broader category of deontological understandings of the criminal
law. For a non-retributive, non-consequentialist understanding of the criminal law, see Scanlon, Punishment and
the Rule of Law, supra note 132.
1066 [Vol. 42:1027
HeinOnline  -- 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1066 2005
THE "ABUSE EXCUSE" IN CAPITAL SENTENCING TRIALS
VII. SOME OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
A. Is It Responsibility in Disguise?
Earlier, I argued that from the evidence provided, there was no reason to
consider Harris less than fully responsible for his crimes on the basis that he had a
diminished capacity for considering distinctly moral reasons. One might counter
that the argument I present, emphasizing moral education as a safeguard against
incurring criminal punishment, is inconsistent or in tension with my earlier claim.
The objection might be that I am admitting that a childhood like Harris' makes it
more difficult for him to bring moral principles to bear on the choices he makes. As
Wallace states, such a childhood makes it difficult for the victim, as an adult, to
take moral requirements seriously. 139 The objection is also based on an aspect of
responsibility that I endorsed; that is, responsibility comes in degrees. The objector
would conclude, insofar as responsibility requires the ability to control oneself in
light of moral principles, and not simply the ability to reason practically, I am
admitting that Harris' was not fully responsible for his crimes.
There are two ways to interpret the objection. First, perhaps it raises a partial
global excuse or exemption for Harris: that in general, he is not a fully responsible
agent because of a diminished capacity to control himself in light of moral
considerations. I have argued that there are moral reasons to reject this view
because it is demeaning to Harris and persons with similar backgrounds, as
persons who assess reasons and live according to those assessments, to be deemed
less than fully responsible. However, an objector might think those moral reasons
are beside the point: if Harris is less than fully responsible, then, regardless of the
distasteful implications, so be it.
This objection conflates the distinction between having the general capacity to
grasp and be guided by our most basic moral considerations and lacking the
motivation to live according to them. As argued, Harris understood quite well what
constitutes cruelty. He did not feel the force of the reasons not to be cruel, but that
does not imply that he lacked a capacity to recognize those reasons and control his
behavior. His childhood allows us to understand why he was not motivated by
moral and legal considerations, but lacking motivation does not provide any kind
of excusing condition, even if it means a person is more likely to engage in
immoral and criminal conduct.
Second, perhaps underlying the proposed objection is a persuasive rationale for
local excuses, such as duress. For example, Stephen Morse argues that the law
excuses an agent under duress because she was wrongfully faced with a "hard
choice." More specifically, "an agent faced with a particularly 'hard choice'-
commit a crime or be killed or grievously injured-is excused if the choice was too
139. WALLACE, supra note 13, at 232.
2005] 1067
HeinOnline  -- 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1067 2005
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
hard to require the agent to resist." 14 0 The standard is objective: "If the person of
reasonable firmness would resist, the choice is not too hard."'14 1 Clearly, even a
partial excuse based on this construal of duress is not available to Harris; no other
agent coerced him into choosing between murdering his youthful victims or be
killed, himself. But one might suggest that some agents face "internal" hard
choices, such as drug or gambling addicts. Such agents find it very difficult not to
give in to their impulses, and perhaps that is why we are tempted to see them as
less responsible when they do. 142 Extending the reasoning to Harris, the suggestion
would be that, because of his anti-moral education, it is too difficult for him to
choose the right course of action when he sees an opportunity for anti-social
conduct; therefore, we have reason to think he is less than fully responsible. 1
43
This objection fails because the way in which it is "difficult" for Harris to refrain from
anti-social conduct is not analogous to the way in which it is difficult for someone under
duress or an addict to make the right decision. There are two essential components to
duress, whether external or internal, that are absent in Harris' case. First, there is the
threat of severe pain, due either to physical harm caused by a coercing agent or to a
"supremely dysphoric inner state[]"' 44 caused by failing to satisfy a compulsive desire.
Second, in assessing whether a person of reasonable firmness would resist the threat of
such pain, we assume that the agent has a countervailing motive to do what is fight or
best. Those two features of duress make intelligible the claim that coerced agents are
faced with a hard choice. They are strongly motivated to avoid great pain and death, and
also motivated to avoid doing what they see as wrong. Neither feature exists in Harris'
case. He was under no threat of severe harm, either from a coercing agent or the thought
of not giving into a compulsive desire like a drug addict's. And even if it would have
caused him psychological pain to resist anti-social impulses, he was clearly lacking a
countervailing moral motive to resist. His expressed satisfaction in killing the boys
evidenced his endorsement, after the fact, of his murders. He did not show any remorse,
in the way that an unwilling addict would after giving in to his addiction. To say that it
was difficult for him to control his actions in light of moral considerations, then, has
nothing to do with the "difficult choice" that underlies local excuses such as duress.
B. Is It Nevertheless Elitist or Demeaning?
I previously argued that there are moral reasons to deem the suffering of severe
abuse as a punishment-related, but not a responsibility-related, consideration. It is
140. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, supra note 13, at 124.
141. Id. at 125.
142. 1 agree with Morse, though, that we do not excuse, or even partially excuse, such agents for giving in to
their desire for drugs or to gamble on the basis that they face an "internal hard choice." Rather, as Morse argues,
addicts would only have an excuse insofar as their rational capacities are diminished. Id. at 126-27.
143. This proposed objection is only based on Morse's responsibility theory, and is not necessarily implied by
his view.
144. Morse, Deprivation and Desert, supra note 13, at 126.
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important not to diminish the responsibility-status of beings capable of recogniz-
ing and being guided by reasons because it is demeaning. However, one might
argue that my account is nevertheless demeaning to agents like Harris. After all, I
am saying that there is reason to consider imposing the more lenient of two
sentences on them, compared to other defendants who commit equally atrocious
acts. On this objection, respect requires equal punishment.
The proposed objection might appeal to reasoning similar to Michael Moore's
argument for why retributive judgments are not necessarily spawned by vicious
emotions, but rather may be motivated by virtuous guilt. Moore argues that "[o]ur
concern for retributive justice might be motivated by ... the feelings of guilt we
would have if we did the kinds of acts that fill the criminal appellate reports of any
state."' 145 He invites us to imagine how we would feel if we committed an
absolutely brutal murder. Moore writes that he hopes he would feel "guilty unto
death," that no amount of suffering imposed could exceed what he would
deserve. 146 Guilt would be the virtuous response. His conclusion is that we should
trust the judgment reflected by this imagined guilt (that we would deserve death)
because, as a virtue, this feeling "comes with good epistemic credentials."
' 147
Moore next asks whether there is any reason not to extend this judgment to any
responsible agent who committed such a murder. 14 8 He argues that we should be
morally suspicious of any inclination not to because "[i]t is elitist and condescend-
ing towards others not to grant them the same responsibility and desert you grant to
yourself."' 49 It is demeaning to regard oneself as "more of a person" than
others.' 50 Rather, we should determine someone's just deserts by asking what we
would deserve if we committed the crime in question.151
Based on Moore's remarks, one might contend that my argument is demeaning
to responsible adults who suffered severe abuse as children because I would not
see a reason to mitigate my own punishment if I committed a murder like the one
Harris committed. If I would "feel guilty unto death" for committing a murder,
then, on risk of being elitist, I should extend the underlying judgment to all other
fully responsible agents.
First, it is important to emphasize a limitation on the argument presented. I have
not argued that capital defendants who suffer severe childhood abuse do not
deserve the death penalty. I have argued that there is a reason to consider severe
childhood abuse as one mitigating factor. Relative to capital defendants who were
145. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS
212 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
146. Id. at 213.
147. ld. at 214.
148. See id. at 215.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER, AND THE EMOTIONS
216 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
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provided the safeguard of a moral education, it is more difficult to justify the most
severe form of punishment for defendants deprived of that safeguard.
Second, in response, it is not elitist to consider severe childhood abuse as a
mitigating factor because doing so does not rest on a thought of being "more of a
person" than someone with such a background. It is not rooted in a great "we-they"
attitude towards criminals, which Moore rightly warns us against adopting or
endorsing. Rather, the reactions that many jurors have to evidence of childhood
abuse are based on the same kind of thought experiment Moore raises. Hearing
evidence about the torture and disregard Harris suffered makes us wonder how we
would have responded to such treatment, forcing us to consider whether our moral
self is more fragile than we would like to think. 152 Of course, there is something
metaphysically suspicious about considering the counterfactual, "if I had been
raised like Harris.. ."; in a clear sense, I would not be me if I had such a drastically
different childhood. But nevertheless, the point is that our initial intuition that
suffering severe abuse is relevant to punishment is not rooted in a shameful, elitist
emotion, but rather in an empathetic attitude.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
A penalty-phase jury's verdict is supposed to reflect a reasoned moral re-
sponse, 153 not "turn on the vagaries of particular jurors' emotional sensitivities." 154
At the same time, not only must states allow capital defendant to submit evidence
of their childhood experiences, but a capital defense attorney would violate his
client's Sixth Amendment right to counsel if she did not make reasonable
investigations into her client's past, unless it was reasonable not to. ' 55 This Article
has searched for the reasons for penalty-phase jurors to consider evidence showing
that a capital defendant suffered severe abuse and neglect as child. This kind of
prevalent penalty-phase evidence is worrisome if the rationale for its consideration
in mitigation is that a defendant's crime may be attributable to his childhood
experiences, in the sense that it was caused by his past.
There are two ways in which suffering severe childhood abuse and neglect may,
in fact, be relevant to a sentencing jury's determination. First, suffering abuse is
relevant if it caused an individual's capacity for rational self-control to be
152. Watson, Responsibility and the Limits of Evil, supra note 13, at 276. Watson writes:
What is unsettling [when hearing such evidence] is the thought that one's moral self is such a
fragile thing. One tends to think of one's moral sensibilities as going deeper than that (thought it is
not clear what this means). This thought induces not only an ontological shudder, but a sense of
equality with the other: I too am a potential sinner.
153. Smith v. Texas, 125 S. Ct. 400, 406 (2004) (citing Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 796 (2001)).
154. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,493 (1989).
155. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (citing Stickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-691
(1984)).
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diminished to some degree, in comparison to the capacity for rational self-control
necessary for full responsibility. Note that if the abuse has caused a diminished
capacity for rational self-control, whether in general or in stressful situations, what
is morally relevant to assessing the agent's responsibility is not the abuse, but
rather the diminished capacity for reasoning.
Even if the abuse did not cause a diminished capacity for responsibility, we
intuit that capital sentencing jurors, nevertheless, have a reason to consider
evidence that the defendant suffered severe abuse and neglect. And there is a
reason: In determining whether it is fair to impose a sanction on an individual, it is
morally relevant whether he was deprived a morally important safeguard against
incurring that sanction. Insofar as suffering severe abuse and neglect is inconsis-
tent with an effective moral education, individuals who suffered such abuse were
deprived a safeguard against entering a life of violence that plays a role in
establishing the fairness of imposing criminal punishment. It is difficult to justify
our harshest sentence under law for an offender when he was deprived of a
significant safeguard, especially in comparison to others not deprived of it.
An attractive feature of that second rationale for abuse evidence is that it avoids
the problematic moral implications of the conclusion that the relevance of abuse
must be connected to reducing a capital defendant's responsibility. To the extent
that we partially excuse someone who rightfully understands himself as having the
capacity to reason practically and control his behavior, we demean him because of
the connection between being considered responsible and the respect due persons.
We also risk diminishing the wrong suffered by the victim.
A practical upshot of these arguments is that courts and attorneys should cease
describing this kind of mitigating evidence as an "explanation" of the crime or as
exhibiting an "extenuating circumstance." That language is unhelpful and confus-
ing, at best. And when those terms are used in contrast to "an excuse" or a denial of
responsibility, we should expect them to be viewed with suspicion. If the defense is
claiming that the defendant's childhood left him with mental impairments that
interfered with his capacity for rational self-control, in comparison to others
without such impairments, it should state that the defendant is not seeking an
excuse, but only a very limited, partial excuse in relation to others without the
defect in reasoning capacities.
More illuminating language is available for a case like Harris', in which the
defendant did not commit his crime under any stress or circumstance that
compromised his capacity for rational self-control. Defense attorneys and court
instructions should explain that evidence that the defendant suffered through a
miserable childhood of constant abuse is aimed to show that he was deprived of a
morally significant protection or safeguard against living a violent life. In recogniz-
ing that the death penalty is not intended for all murder convicts, it is worth
stressing that defendants who suffered severe abuse and neglect were deprived of a
safeguard in comparison to others who were not treated as such. We all can
acknowledge that a childhood conducive to internalizing moral principles provides
10712005]
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a better chance for an individual of avoiding violence and criminal sanctions, and it
is therefore easier to justify a harsher punishment for someone who has been
shown the value of the law and the benefits of living a moral life and participating
in interpersonal relationships based on mutual respect and affection. It can be
appropriate to hold a defendant fully responsible for his crime and simultaneously
maintain that the more lenient of two sentencing options is appropriate, relative to
another individual responsible for the same crime, because the latter was provided
an extra safeguard or better chance of avoiding antisocial conduct. For such a case,
we can make sense of the typical defense claim that the defendant is not seeking at
all to excuse himself from responsibility, but is rather making a case for life
imprisonment instead of the death penalty.
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